David Enoch

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With David Enoch

David Enoch is affiliated with the following schools: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, New York University

David Enoch 's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

David Enoch

Philosophy

#6838

World Rank

#9945

Historical Rank

Logic

#8187

World Rank

#10204

Historical Rank

philosophy Degrees

Download Badge

Philosophy

Why Is David Enoch Influential?

(Suggest an Edit or Addition)

According to Wikipedia, David Enoch is an ethicist and philosopher of law with research interests in moral, political and legal philosophy within the analytic tradition. He is the co-director of the Center for Moral and Political Philosophy and has been the Rodney Blackman Chair in the Philosophy of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem since 2005. He received his Bachelor of Arts in philosophy and Bachelor of Laws degrees from Tel Aviv University in 1993. He then completed his PhD in philosophy at New York University in 2003.

(See a Problem?)

David Enoch 's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Taking Morality Seriously (2011) (340)
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense Of Robust Realism (2011) (328)
Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What is Constitutive of Action (2006) (239)
The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it (2010) (182)
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge (2012) (134)
Against Public Reason (2015) (112)
Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement (2010) (107)
How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified? (2008) (94)
A Defense of Moral Deference (2014) (79)
The Case Against Moral Luck (2007) (75)
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? (2009) (70)
Sense and 'Sensitivity': Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence (2015) (63)
Authority and Reason-Giving (2014) (61)
The Disorder of Public Reason (2013) (48)
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason? (2009) (47)
Reason-Giving and the Law (2011) (47)
Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You`re on a Very Slippery Slope (2001) (42)
Giving Practical Reasons (2011) (41)
Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens (2006) (41)
Why Idealize?* (2005) (37)
Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy* (2017) (35)
Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency (2015) (30)
Non-Naturalistic Realism in Metaethics (2017) (29)
Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty: A Reply to Jackson and Smith (2008) (24)
Moral Luck and the Law (2010) (24)
Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference? (2007) (23)
II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action (2016) (23)
An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism (2015) (23)
A Right to Violate One's Duty (2002) (20)
Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice (2007) (20)
The Disorder of Public Reason* (2013) (17)
INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE* (2007) (17)
Wouldn't It Be Nice If p, Therefore, p (for a moral p) (2009) (17)
Patient or Pretender: Inside the Strange World of Factitious Disorders (1994) (15)
What do you mean “This isn’t the question”? (2017) (15)
Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck (2010) (14)
How Principles Ground (2019) (14)
RATIONALITY, COHERENCE, CONVERGENCE: A CRITICAL COMMENT ON MICHAEL SMITH'S ETHICS AND THE A PRIORI (2007) (13)
Some Arguments Against Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience Refuted (2002) (12)
False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences (2020) (12)
Taking Disagreement Seriously: On Jeremy Waldron's Law and Disagreement (2006) (11)
How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking (2003) (11)
Delusional Jealousy and Awareness of Reality (1991) (11)
Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason (2015) (10)
In defense of Taking Morality Seriously: reply to Manne, Sobel, Lenman, and Joyce (2014) (10)
Legal as a Thick Concept (2012) (9)
On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: A Critical Notice of Slaves of the Passions (2011) (9)
SENSITIVITY, SAFETY, AND THE LAW: A REPLY TO PARDO (2019) (9)
Tort Liability and Taking Responsibility (2015) (9)
Reconsidering Intentions∗ (2016) (6)
Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable (2020) (5)
On Estlund's Democratic Authority (2015) (5)
How Objectivity Matters (2015) (5)
A Comment on Yaffe's Attempts (2012) (5)
Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents (2018) (5)
The Masses and the Elites: Political Philosophy for the Age of Brexit, Trump & Netanyahu (2017) (5)
Is General Jurisprudence Interesting (2015) (4)
Does Legal Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? On Fetishism, Two-Tier System Design, and Conscientious Fact-Finding (2021) (4)
On Analogies, Disanalogies, and Moral Philosophy: A Comment on John Mikhail's Elements of Moral Cognition (2013) (4)
Playing the Hand You're Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different from Morally Significant Plain Luck (and Probably Doesn't Exist) (2019) (4)
Is General Jurisprudence Interesting? (2019) (4)
Playing the Hand You're Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different from Morally Significant Plain Luck (And Probably Doesn’t Exist) (2019) (4)
Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone (2021) (4)
The masses and the elites: political philosophy for the age of Brexit, Trump and Netanyahu (2017) (3)
Autonomy as Non‐alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics* (2021) (3)
Constitutivism (2020) (3)
IN DEFENSE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS (OR ANYWAY, PROCEDURAL DUTIES): A RESPONSE TO WELLMAN (2018) (3)
Personal Decisions, Public Consequences: On Distinguishing between the Vaccinated and the Non-Vaccinated in Coronavirus Management (2021) (3)
Ends, Means, Side-Effects, and Beyond: A Comment on the Justification of the Use of Force (2005) (3)
On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism (2015) (3)
Emphysematous cystitis in an 80-year-old female. (2010) (2)
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE : THE CASE FOR SENSITIVITY (2013) (2)
Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics (2016) (2)
A troublesome head-butt. (2007) (2)
Sobel, David. From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 352. $85.00 (cloth). (2018) (2)
עוד על הפטור משירות צבאי מטעמי מצפון: תגובה לדני סטטמן More on the Conscience-Based Exemption from Military Service: A Reply to Dani Statman (2015) (1)
Whose Right Is It? Reflections on Harel's Reflections on Palestinians' Interest in Return (2004) (1)
How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen (2020) (1)
Autonomy as Non-Alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics (2021) (1)
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Moral Realism (2015) (1)
Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails (2019) (1)
Précis of Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford University Press, 2011) (2014) (1)
The Argument from the Moral Implications of Objectivity (or Lack Thereof ) (2011) (0)
Doing with Less (2011) (0)
Tallying Plausibility Points (2011) (0)
In defense of Taking Morality Seriously: reply to Manne, Sobel, Lenman, and Joyce (2013) (0)
The Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies - Editors' Foreword (2010) (0)
Othello syndrome (2020) (0)
Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso (2017) (0)
Taking Morality Seriously is an engaging and ambitious piece of metaethics, and I congratulate (2018) (0)
A Setting up the Problem 1 The Right / Wrong Distinction (2012) (0)
And Now, Robust Metaethical Realism (2011) (0)
Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso (2018) (0)
The View, the Motivation, the Book (2011) (0)
Possession states and allied syndromes (2020) (0)
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE (2015) (0)
Re’em Segev* MORAL RIGHTNESS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LAW: WHY, HOW, ANDWHEN MISTAKE OF LAWMATTERS† The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability (2014) (0)
Couvade syndrome (2020) (0)
עיון פילוסופי במשפט ועל אודותיו (Philosophical Discussion of and in the Law) (2015) (0)
Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid (2019) (0)
Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid (2020) (0)
Précis of Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford University Press, 2011) (2013) (0)
The Argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative Truths (2011) (0)
על פסק הדין של בית הדין הצבאי בעניין חמשת הסרבנים On the Military Court's Decision in the Matter of the Five Objectors (2015) (0)
Other uncommon psychiatric syndromes (2020) (0)
David Estlund Reply to Commentators (2008) (0)
Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable (2020) (0)
Ekbom’s syndrome (delusional infestation) and body dysmorphic disorder (2020) (0)
Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson (2001) (0)
Munchausen’s syndrome and related factitious disorders (2020) (0)
Correction to: Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable (2020) (0)
‘No, actually your life is going considerably worse’: a comment on Nir Eyal (2020) (0)
Quinolones (2015) (0)

This paper list is powered by the following services:

Other Resources About David Enoch

en.wikipedia.org

What Schools Are Affiliated With David Enoch ?

David Enoch is affiliated with the following schools: