David Martimort | Academic Influence

David Martimort's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

David Martimort

Economics

#2740

World Rank

#3118

Historical Rank

Microeconomics

#159

World Rank

#167

Historical Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

David Martimort's Degrees

PhD Economics Federal University of Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées
Masters Economics Federal University of Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées
Bachelors Economics Federal University of Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées

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Why Is David Martimort Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, David Martimort is a French economist and Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics. Martimort is one of the most highly cited researchers in the field of contract theory. His research has been awarded the Best Young French Economist Award in 2004.

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David Martimort's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001) (1715)
Collusion under Asymmetric Information (1997) (372)
COMPETING MECHANISMS IN A COMMON VALUE ENVIRONMENT (2000) (364)
Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation (2000) (338)
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships (2008) (315)
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior (1999) (295)
Collusion and Delegation (1998) (250)
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory (1996) (249)
The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships (2015) (247)
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2002) (218)
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs (1999) (198)
Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships (2012) (193)
The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships (2008) (172)
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria (2001) (131)
The multiprincipal nature of government (1996) (130)
Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting (2005) (122)
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise (2007) (122)
Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions (1999) (119)
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games (2001) (118)
Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers (1992) (107)
Competition under Nonlinear Pricing (1994) (105)
Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent (2006) (105)
Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games (2009) (89)
Continuity in Mechanism Design without Transfers (2006) (87)
Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators (1999) (84)
An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization (2006) (75)
The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector (2010) (74)
The Firm as a Multicontract Organization (1997) (73)
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts (1996) (69)
The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors (2010) (60)
The benefits of extended liability (2006) (59)
On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability (2004) (59)
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness (2014) (58)
Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition (2008) (56)
'Build it or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships (2006) (53)
The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing (1999) (52)
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design (2006) (52)
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs (1998) (49)
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information (2010) (49)
Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities (2006) (47)
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements (2016) (46)
Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs (2009) (46)
Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers (1998) (45)
The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics (2008) (44)
On some agency costs of intermediated contracting (2001) (43)
Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency (2012) (42)
Transaction costs, politics, regulatory institutions and regulatory outcomes (2000) (40)
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts (2010) (34)
Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information (2007) (34)
The Organization of Delegated Expertise (2004) (33)
Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions (2012) (33)
Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism (2015) (33)
Selecting equilibria in common agency games (2009) (32)
How much discretion for risk regulators (2012) (32)
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts (2016) (31)
An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision (2005) (30)
The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector (2009) (30)
A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior (1997) (29)
The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries (2005) (28)
The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries (2005) (28)
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy (2013) (28)
The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth (2004) (27)
How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World: A Critical Appraisal of Public–Private Partnerships (2016) (27)
Two-Tier Asymmetric Information as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies, and Inefficient Trade Agreements (2014) (26)
Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion (2003) (26)
Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting (2004) (25)
Contracting for an Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information (2010) (25)
Common agency with informed principals (2004) (22)
The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth (1999) (20)
Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games (2011) (20)
Funding and Financing Infrastructure: The Joint-Use of Public and Private Finance (2018) (20)
Solving the Global Warming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help! (2013) (20)
Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard (2006) (19)
Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching (2001) (18)
Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design 1 (2006) (17)
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement (2013) (17)
Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment" (2013) (17)
Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships (2011) (17)
Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information (2007) (16)
Delegated Common Agency under Moral Hazard and the Formation of Interest Groups (2004) (16)
Pessimistic information gathering (2015) (15)
COMPETING MECHANISMS IN A COMMON VALUE ENVIRONMENT BY BRUNO BIAIS, (2005) (15)
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements (2013) (15)
COMPETING MECHANISMS IN A COMMON VALUE ENVIRONMENT BY BRUNO BIAIS, (2005) (15)
Collusion‐Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods (1999) (14)
Frontiers in the Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability (2006) (14)
Agricultural Markets: Mechanisms, Failures and Regulations (1996) (13)
Corruption in public–private partnerships (2013) (13)
The Firm as a Multicontact Organization (1996) (13)
Default and Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Auctions (2015) (13)
The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in the Control of Environmental Risk (2008) (13)
TRANSACTION COSTS AND INCENTIVE THEORY (2000) (12)
Delegation and R&D Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2008) (12)
Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator (2007) (11)
The benefits of central bank's political independence (2004) (11)
The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors (2005) (11)
Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information (2015) (11)
Transaction Costs of Collusion and Organizational Design (2001) (10)
'When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?': New Insights from Asymmetric Information When Supply Chains Compete (2011) (10)
The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry (2007) (10)
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition (2019) (9)
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games (2013) (9)
Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs (2008) (9)
Corruption in Public-Private Partnerships, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness (2014) (9)
Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy (2009) (8)
Monitoring a Common Agent (2003) (7)
Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian Growth (1999) (7)
Identification and Estimation of Incentive Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Application to the French Water Sector ∗ (2013) (6)
On the Robustness of Truthful Equilibria in Common Agency Games 1 (2004) (6)
The Theory of Incentives Applied to PPPs in the Transport Sector (2009) (6)
From inside the firm to the growth process (2003) (6)
Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited Under Asymmetric Information (2017) (6)
“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making (2019) (5)
Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines (2011) (5)
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach (2012) (5)
Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design (2013) (5)
Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types (2001) (5)
Contractual Externalities in Common Agency Games (2003) (4)
Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets: "How to Regulate Regulated Prices?" (2019) (4)
The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracts for Competing Hierarchies (2007) (4)
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game (2018) (4)
Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview (2007) (4)
Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying (2004) (3)
Continuity in Mechanism Design without Transfers 1 (2006) (3)
Introduction to the Special Issue on Public‐Private Partnerships (2015) (3)
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias (2019) (3)
The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment (2006) (3)
Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management for Public Utilities (2004) (3)
Optimal Domestic Regulation and the Pattern of Trade (2004) (3)
Estimating Optimal Contracts under Delegated Management in the French Water Sector (2009) (3)
Merger Guidelines for Bidding Markets (2016) (3)
Chapter 2: Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design (2006) (2)
Transaction Costs and Incentie Theory (2000) (2)
Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts Corrigendum (1998) (2)
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Linear State, Semicontinuous Lagrangians (2014) (2)
Mechanism Design with Private Communication 1 (2007) (2)
The Informational E ¤ ects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics 1 (2007) (2)
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games (2016) (2)
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice (2016) (2)
The Transaction Costs of Delegated Supervision (1999) (2)
“ Build It or Not ” : Normative and Positive Theories of Private-Public Partnerships ∗ (2006) (2)
Strategic Trade Policy for Uninformed Policy Makers (1997) (2)
Transnational Projects and Public Goods: A Comparative Study (2003) (2)
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process (2009) (2)
Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: on the Value of the Precautionary Principle (2020) (2)
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games 1 (2011) (2)
PRIVATIZATION and CORRUPTION 1 (2006) (1)
THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW (2012) (1)
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts for Manufacturers-Retailers Hierarchies (2008) (1)
Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks (2018) (1)
The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests (2011) (1)
The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts (2010) (1)
The limits to price discrimination (2001) (1)
Transaction Costs and Contract Theory (2002) (1)
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners (2018) (1)
How Much Discretion for Risk Regulation ? 1 (2009) (1)
Downstream mergers in vertically related markets with capacity constraints (2020) (1)
DYNAMIC PROCUREMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: OPTIMAL DESIGN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RENEGOTIATION AND TENDER PROCEDURES1 (2015) (1)
“WHEN OLSON MEETS DAHL”: FROM INEFFICIENT GROUP FORMATION TO (2016) (1)
Introduction to the Special Issue on Frontiers in Environmental Economics (2018) (0)
Reform for Sale (2023) (0)
International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach (2010) (0)
Effects of vertical restraints and access to distribution networks: Exclusivity practices in the agricultural machinery sector (2014) (0)
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information and Non-Market Externalities when Supply Chains Compete (2010) (0)
"En premier" sale as a form of intertemporal price discrimination (2001) (0)
Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures (2022) (0)
Some Reflections on Public-Private Partnerships (2008) (0)
THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM OF BEAUTY CONTESTS 1 June 2011 (2011) (0)
Optimal regulation design of airports: Investment incentives and impact of commercial services (2022) (0)
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University) (2019) (0)
Working paper PRECAUTION , INFORMATION AND TIME-INCONSISTENCY : DO WE NEED A PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE ? 1 November 11 , 2019 (2019) (0)
Participation Constraints in Discontinuous Adverse Selection Models (2020) (0)
Resale-Below-Cost Laws with Incentive-Based Bill-Back Allowances ∗ (2016) (0)
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection (2017) (0)
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Opening (2015) (0)
From Inside the Growth Process (2003) (0)
Mechanism Design with Bilateral Contracting 1 (2007) (0)
How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic (2011) (0)
Author's Personal Copy Games and Economic Behavior Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency (0)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for non-smooth, linear-state optimal control problems (2019) (0)
Tricks with Aggregate Games (2009) (0)
Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer’s Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power (2021) (0)
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games (2015) (0)
The Economics of Contracts: Transaction costs and incentive theory (2002) (0)
M ONITORING A C OMMON A GENT : I MPLICATIONS FOR F INANCIAL C ONTRACTING (2005) (0)
In memoriam Jean-Jacques Laffont (2005) (0)
Hit. Ubrarie8 -oewe¥ (2011) (0)
Replication data for: The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector (2012) (0)
Delegated Monitoring versus Arm ’ s Length Contracting 1 by (2004) (0)
Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletly Informed Policymakers (2015) (0)
Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process (2011) (0)
Restoring the primacy of consumer in the competitive analysis (2017) (0)
The Economic Theory of Incentives (2017) (0)
A theory of common agency with common screening devices, with applications to public goods, price discrimination and political influence (2004) (0)
Collusion under asymmetric information [[Collusion en information asymétrique]] (1997) (0)
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-smooth linear-state optimal control problems (2009) (0)
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - David Martimort (Paris School of Economics) (2019) (0)
Recent Developments on Regulation and Liability (2006) (0)
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games ( preliminary ) (2009) (0)
9. Limits and Extensions (2002) (0)
1. Incentives in Economic Thought (2002) (0)
From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model (2020) (0)
A Theory of Contracts with Limited (2013) (0)
8. Dynamics under Full Commitment (2002) (0)

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