Fuhito Kojima

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Fuhito Kojima

Fuhito Kojima is affiliated with the following schools: Yale University, University of Tokyo, Stanford University, Columbia University, Harvard University

Fuhito Kojima's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Fuhito Kojima

Economics

#4073

World Rank

#4610

Historical Rank

Microeconomics

#209

World Rank

#220

Historical Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Fuhito Kojima's Degrees

PhD Economics Stanford University
Masters Economics Stanford University
Bachelors Economics University of Tokyo

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Why Is Fuhito Kojima Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Fuhito Kojima is a Japanese economist and a professor at the University of Tokyo. Career He received a B.A. from University of Tokyo in 2003 and a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2008. Fellowships and awards 2008–2011, Fellow, VCASI.2013–2015, Sloan Research Fellow.2014–present, SIEPR Fellow.2015–present, Economic Theory Fellow.2016, Social Choice and Welfare Prize.2021, Nakahara Prize

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Fuhito Kojima's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013) (330)
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2007) (235)
Appendix to "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets" (2009) (216)
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (2010) (213)
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015) (212)
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013) (194)
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008) (190)
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action (2012) (186)
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (2010) (174)
AXIOMS FOR DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE (2010) (128)
Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects (2009) (115)
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2014) (93)
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (2009) (88)
Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis (2018) (74)
Matching with Contracts: Comment (2008) (73)
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (2017) (73)
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration (2006) (71)
Stable Matching in Large Economies (2019) (66)
Improving Schools Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach (2016) (57)
Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalence (2014) (51)
Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies (2014) (51)
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition: Matching with constraints (2018) (50)
Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program (2010) (40)
Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (2013) (40)
Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic stability (2007) (35)
Robust stability in matching markets (2011) (35)
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution (2012) (32)
Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (2023) (31)
Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency (2017) (31)
The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism (2010) (29)
Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets (2006) (28)
Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints (2017) (27)
IMPLEMENTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS : A GENERALIZATION OF THE BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN THEOREM (2009) (26)
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (2008) (26)
Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (2010) (23)
Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching (2014) (22)
Efficient assignment with interdependent values (2015) (21)
Job Matching under Constraints (2020) (21)
Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences (2012) (19)
Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games (2006) (18)
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS OF THE PROBABILISTIC SERIAL MECHANISM IN LARGE RANDOM ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS (2007) (18)
Many-to-one matching with complementarities and peer effects (2007) (18)
IMPLEMENTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS, PART I: A GENERALIZATION OF THE BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN THEOREM (2009) (15)
Matching and Price Competition: Comment (2007) (14)
Stability and instability of the unbeatable strategy in dynamic processes (2006) (13)
Recent Developments in Matching Theory and Their Practical Applications (2017) (13)
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment (2018) (12)
Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics (2011) (10)
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MATCHING THEORY AND ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS (2015) (10)
Finding all stable matchings with couples (2015) (9)
The “rural hospital theorem” revisited (2012) (9)
The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (2008) (8)
The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models (2013) (7)
Weak Monotone Comparative Statics (2019) (7)
p-Dominance and perfect foresight dynamics (2008) (7)
New Directions of Study in Matching with Constraints (2019) (6)
Characterizing Pareto Optima: Sequential Utilitarian Welfare Maximization (2020) (6)
Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints (2020) (3)
When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (2007) (3)
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment (2008) (3)
A theory of hung juries and informative voting (2010) (2)
Assignment with Interdependent Values (2012) (1)
Appendix for “ E � cient Matching under Distributional Constraints : Theory and Applications ” (2014) (1)
Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation (2020) (1)
Incentive Compatibility in Matching with Contracts (2007) (1)
Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy (2022) (1)
Paper / Document de travail du personnel 2017 ‐ 4 Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two ‐ Sided Markets with Weak Preferences (2017) (0)
Understanding Stable Matchings : A Non-Cooperative Approach (2013) (0)
Supplementary Appendix for “Weak Monotone Comparative Statics” (2021) (0)
Serie documentos de trabajo A Dynamic School Choice Model (2011) (0)
Affirmative action and welfare in matching markets (2006) (0)
Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply (2021) (0)
Corrections and updates for second printing of Osborne and Rubinstein's "A Course in Game Theory" (MIT Press, 1994) (2012) (0)
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives (2022) (0)
Letter from the editors (2015) (0)
A Web Appendix for ”Matching with Con- tracts: Corrigendum” (2008) (0)
ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY* (2022) (0)
Equilibrium of Blockchain Miners with Dynamic Asset Allocation (2020) (0)
Toward market design in practice: a progress report (2021) (0)
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2013) (0)
Replication package for: Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (2021) (0)
Representation Theorems for Path-Independent Choice Rules (2023) (0)
de travail du personnel 2019-22 Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers by Shota Ichihashi (2019) (0)
MAJORITY STABILITY: COMBINING SOCIAL CHOICE AND MATCHING THEORY TO UNDERSTAND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY (2019) (0)
25 Th International Conference on Game Theory Organizers: Plenary Speakers (2014) (0)
Roth, Alvin(born 1951) (2013) (0)
Information Acquisition and Robust Trading Mechanisms (2017) (0)
"Near"Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima (2020) (0)
Market Design (2020) (0)
Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints (2019) (0)
Online Appendices for Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms (2012) (0)
Implementation of Efficient Investments in Mechanism Design Kentaro Tomoeda (2016) (0)
Letter from the editors (2015) (0)
A Theory of Hung Jury and Informative Voting ∗ (2007) (0)
Material SUPPLEMENT TO “ STABLE MATCHING IN LARGE ECONOMIES ” ( Econometrica (2019) (0)
Material SUPPLEMENT TO “ STABLE MATCHING IN LARGE ECONOMIES ” ( Econometrica (2019) (0)
Replication data for: Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints (2019) (0)
Essays on *matching and market design (2008) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Fuhito Kojima?

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Fuhito Kojima's Academic­Influence.com Rankings