George Tsebelis

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With George Tsebelis

George Tsebelis is affiliated with the following schools: Washington University in St. Louis, University of California, Berkeley, University of Texas at Austin, University of Michigan, University of California, Los Angeles

George Tsebelis's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

George Tsebelis

Political Science

#370

World Rank

#502

Historical Rank

#218

USA Rank

political-science Degrees

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Political Science

George Tsebelis's Degrees

PhD Political Science University of California, Berkeley
Masters Political Science University of California, Berkeley

Why Is George Tsebelis Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, George Tsebelis is a Greek-American political scientist who specializes in comparative politics and formal modeling. He is currently Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan.

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George Tsebelis's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995) (2219)
Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (2002) (2122)
Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (1990) (982)
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis (1999) (649)
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter (1994) (606)
Legislative Politics in the European Union (2000) (539)
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism (1996) (409)
The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union (2001) (377)
Veto Players and Institutional Analysis (2000) (372)
Coalition Formation in the European Parliament (1999) (281)
Bicameralism: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BICAMERALISM AND IMPLICATIONS (1997) (231)
The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy (1989) (207)
Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries (2004) (190)
Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union? (1999) (188)
Veto Players and Referendums Around the World (2002) (168)
Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis (2001) (168)
More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser (1996) (156)
Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European union (1996) (149)
Are Sanctions Effective? (1990) (139)
Veto Players and Decision-Making in the EU after Nice (2002) (139)
Penalty has no Impact on Crime: (1990) (132)
Agenda setting, vetoes and the european union's co‐decision procedure (1997) (122)
Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America (2005) (102)
The history of conditional agenda-setting in European institutions (1998) (96)
The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals (1999) (87)
Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit (2000) (80)
Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU (2001) (74)
Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas (2011) (72)
Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies (1990) (71)
The role of governments in legislative agenda setting (2013) (64)
The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America (2005) (63)
A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS (1990) (58)
Lessons from the Greek crisis (2016) (56)
More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union (1999) (54)
Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions (1988) (54)
Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France (1995) (53)
Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough? (1990) (53)
A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries (2016) (51)
The EU Legislative Process (2001) (47)
Reform Processes and Policy Change : Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies (2010) (46)
The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention (2007) (44)
Cicero's Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective (1992) (42)
Coercion and revolution: Variations on a predator-prey model (1989) (41)
A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting (1986) (40)
The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries (1991) (39)
Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU (2013) (36)
Reforming the European Union (2012) (33)
Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making Inside the European Parliament (1995) (32)
More on the Co-Decision Endgame (1997) (32)
Approaches to the study of European politics (1999) (32)
Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence (1993) (32)
Coalition theory: a veto players’ approach (2013) (31)
Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact (2014) (28)
Assessing the Contributions of the DOSEI Project (2005) (27)
Thinking About the Recent Past and the Future of the EU (2008) (25)
Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries (2007) (24)
The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world (2017) (22)
Nested Games (2019) (19)
Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America (2016) (15)
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism: erratum (1996) (15)
The European Convention and the Rome and Brussels IGCS: A Veto Players Analysis (2005) (14)
The political power of the french senate: Micromechanisms of bicameral negotiations (1995) (12)
The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Draft and the Constitution for Europe Under a Veto Players Analysis (2005) (11)
Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform (2016) (10)
Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics (2009) (10)
Another Response to Gordon Tullock (1995) (10)
Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction (2011) (9)
When Do Allies Become Rivals (1988) (8)
The Institutional Determinants of Supranationalism in the European Union (1999) (8)
Reform Processes and Policy Change (2011) (8)
Governments and Legislative Agenda Setting : An Introduction (2011) (8)
From the European convention to the Lisbon agreement and beyond: A veto player analysis (2012) (7)
Democratic Peace Revisited: It is Veto Players (2009) (7)
Constitutional Rigidity Matters: A Veto Players Approach (2021) (6)
Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective (1994) (5)
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1999) (5)
Why Greece Will Cave—and How (2015) (5)
How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba” (2018) (4)
The Greek Constitution from a political science point of view (2017) (4)
Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament (1995) (4)
A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries – CORRIGENDUM (2016) (3)
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies1 (2002) (3)
The Rules of Decisionmaking in EU Institutions (2012) (2)
Chapitre 5. Institutional analyses of the european union (2004) (2)
Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decision-making in the EU. IHS Political Science Series No. 132, February 2013 (2013) (2)
Rational Choice and Culture (2010) (2)
Can the Dutch Electoral System be Improved Upon? (2020) (1)
Multiple vote electoral systems: a remedy for political polarization (2021) (1)
Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions By Mark Hallerberg Word Count : 13 , 088 (2002) (1)
Globalization and Welfare: Which Causes Which? (2010) (1)
Bicameralism: Bicameralism in historical perspective (1997) (1)
Countries Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist (2007) (1)
Response to Rapoport (1990) (1)
Bicameralism: The process of intercameral bargaining (1997) (0)
2 Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit (0)
Part III. Policy Effects of Veto Players (2002) (0)
Daniel Finke, Thomas Konig, Sven-Oliver Proksch, George Tsebelis, Reforming the European Union. Realizing the Impossible, [Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012, 248 s. ] / Rett R. Ludwikowski. (2012) (0)
APSA-CP Winter 1997 (1998) (0)
International Organization Foundation The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union Author ( s ) : (2007) (0)
Making Sense of Marx . By Jon Elster. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Pp. xv + 556. $49.50, cloth; $15.95, paper.) (1986) (0)
A model of conference committees and their proposals (1997) (0)
How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba” (2018) (0)
University of Utah Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective (2007) (0)
Part I. Veto Players Theory (2002) (0)
APSA Contributors (2013) (0)
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 (1986) (0)
Response to Gordon Tullock (1991) (0)
Author ( s ) : George Tsebelis Review by : George Tsebelis Source : The American Political Science Review (2016) (0)
Bicameralism: Introduction to Part I (1997) (0)
The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Constitutional Convention (2006) (0)
Chapter three. The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention (2012) (0)
Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics (2008) (0)
1 Governments and legislative agenda setting An introduction (0)
Agony in Athens (2015) (0)
Bicameralism: A model of intercameral bargaining (1997) (0)
Part II: Veto Players and Institutional Analysis (2002) (0)
The making of EU Institutions (2009) (0)
The outcomes of intercameral bargaining (1997) (0)
The contributors (1991) (0)
Long constitutions are not garrulous, but they are restrictive (2014) (0)
International Organization Foundation An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism Author ( s ) : (2010) (0)
Political Strategies and Nonconvergence (2005) (0)
Response to Mayer (1991) (0)
Reform of the British House of Lords : A Test of Lijphart and Tsebelis (2007) (0)
What Determines the Judicial Discretion of the European Court of Human Rights? (2022) (0)
Bicameralism: The institutions of bicameralism (1997) (0)
Monitoring in Networks and Hierarchies: Congress and Organizations (2017) (0)
Part IV. Systemic Effects Of Veto Players (2002) (0)
The core and the uncovered set of bicameral legislatures (1997) (0)
Comment on Przeworski and Wallerstein (Vol. 76, June 1982, pp. 215-238) (1983) (0)
Bicameralism: Conference committees (1997) (0)
Comparative (2004) (0)
Bicameralism: Series editors' preface (1997) (0)

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Other Resources About George Tsebelis

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What Schools Are Affiliated With George Tsebelis?

George Tsebelis is affiliated with the following schools:

George Tsebelis's Academic­Influence.com Rankings