Ilya Segal

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Ilya Segal

Ilya Segal is affiliated with the following schools: Stanford University, Harvard University

Ilya Segal's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Ilya Segal

Economics

#2982

World Rank

#3388

Historical Rank

#973

USA Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Why Is Ilya Segal Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Ilya R. Segal is an economist who is currently Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, particularly contract theory, mechanism design and auction design. His research interests include the design of competition policy, property rights, contracts, auctions, and other economic mechanisms. Segal has been elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and member of the Toulouse Network for Information Technology. His other awards include Compass Lexecon prize for “the most significant contribution to the understanding and implementation of competition policy,” a Guggenheim Fellowship, a fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, and a Hoover Fellowship.

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Ilya Segal's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (2002) (1242)
Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1997) (1073)
Contracting with Externalities (1997) (457)
Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts (1999) (415)
Naked Exclusion: Comment (2000) (364)
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach (2014) (344)
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2006) (293)
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (2013) (284)
Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments (1998) (231)
Property rights (2010) (220)
Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand (2002) (199)
Antitrust in Innovative Industries (2005) (184)
Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities (2003) (167)
What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising (2012) (151)
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (2003) (138)
The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold‐up and Risk Sharing) (2002) (132)
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure (2009) (111)
Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation (2014) (99)
Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint (1998) (89)
Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining (2003) (82)
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets (2007) (80)
Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation (2017) (64)
Dynamic Mechanism Design ∗ (2012) (64)
The Communication Complexity of Efficient Allocation Problems (2002) (61)
Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation (2020) (53)
The communication cost of selfishness (2009) (49)
Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey (2006) (48)
A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining) (2010) (44)
Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities (2018) (39)
Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete: Comment (2005) (39)
An E ¢ cient Dynamic Mechanism (2005) (35)
Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games (2007) (32)
Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority (2001) (28)
Property Rights And The Efficiency Of Bargaining (2016) (27)
Multi-player and Multi-round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication (2003) (26)
Persuasion with Rational Inattention (2018) (26)
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Prot Maximization and Information Disclosure Preliminary and incomplete (2008) (22)
The Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems (2005) (21)
Effects of Mergers in Two-sided Markets: Examination of the U.S. Radio Industry (2012) (21)
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design: the Independent-Shock Approach (2010) (19)
Designing the US Incentive Auction (2017) (19)
Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms (2008) (18)
Naked Exclusion and Buyer Coordination (1996) (17)
Exponential communication inefficiency of demand queries (2005) (17)
Nash implementation with little communication (2010) (13)
Merger enforcement in two-sided markets ∗ (2010) (12)
Deferred-Acceptance Heuristic Auctions (2013) (12)
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Communication in Economic Mechanisms (2006) (12)
Communication in Economic Mechanisms (2006) (10)
Assessing Economic Outcomes in Simulated Reverse Clock Auctions for Radio Spectrum (2017) (9)
3. Property Rights (2013) (7)
The communication cost of selfishness: ex post implementation (2005) (6)
Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation∗ (2017) (6)
The Politics of Personalized News Aggregation (2019) (6)
The Communication Complexity of E ffi cient Allocation Problems ∗ (2001) (6)
Operations Research Enables Auction to Repurpose Television Spectrum for Next-Generation Wireless Technologies (2019) (6)
The Communication Cost of Sel shness (2007) (5)
Working Paper # 0005 Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments (2000) (4)
The Politics of News Personalization (2019) (3)
Optimal Information Disclosure Luis Rayo (2010) (3)
The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements (2014) (3)
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach — Supplementary Material (2013) (2)
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design (2010) (2)
Revenue Equivalence, Pro…t Maximization, and Transparency in Dynamic Mechanisms (2007) (2)
Proceedings of the international seminar and British-Israel workshop on greenhouse technology, Bet Dagan, Israel, 26 March - 2 April 1990. (1990) (2)
THE DYNAMIC PIVOT MECHANISM BY DIRK BERGEMANN and JUUSO VÄLIMÄKI COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1293 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS (2010) (2)
Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study (2020) (2)
Property Rights and the E¢ ciency of Bargaining (2014) (2)
Property Rights and the Effi ciency of Bargaining∗ (2013) (1)
Estimation of cost synergies from mergers without cost data : Application to US radio (2010) (1)
Communication requirements of e ciency and supporting lindahl prices (2003) (1)
Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized News Aggregation (2020) (1)
Estimation of cost efficiencies from mergers : Application to U . S . radio ∗ Przemys law Jeziorski (2014) (1)
Exponential Communication Ine ¢ ciency of Demand Queries (2004) (1)
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism an Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (2013) (1)
VOTING AND HISTORICAL GAMES A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2010) (0)
Complexity and Coordination by Authority ∗ (2001) (0)
Personalized Information Aggregation and Polarization (2022) (0)
CXIV Issue 2 May 1999 CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES * (1999) (0)
The Politics of Personalized Information Aggregation (2022) (0)
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF PAY TRANSPARENCY (2021) (0)
Report from Dagstuhl Seminar 13161 Interface of Computation , Game Theory , and Economics (2013) (0)
Appendix to “ Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities ” ∗ (2018) (0)
Editorial from the New TEAC Co-Editors-in-Chief (2017) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Ilya Segal?

Ilya Segal is affiliated with the following schools: