Isaac Levi

Isaac Levi's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Isaac Levi

Philosophy

#492

World Rank

#1017

Historical Rank

#226

USA Rank

Logic

#357

World Rank

#697

Historical Rank

#145

USA Rank

philosophy Degrees

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Philosophy

Why Is Isaac Levi Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Isaac Levi was an American philosopher who served as the John Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He is noted for his work in epistemology and decision theory. Education and career Levi was one of several doctoral students of Ernest Nagel at Columbia University who were influential in American post-war philosophy; others were Morton White, Patrick Suppes, and Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Levi taught at Case Western Reserve University before joining the Columbia faculty in 1970. He was elected in 1986 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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Isaac Levi's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Making It Explicit (1994) (1122)
The Enterprise Of Knowledge (1980) (1080)
On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974) (562)
Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict (1986) (220)
Subjunctives, dispositions and chances (1977) (148)
The Enterprise of Knowledge, An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chances. (1983) (139)
Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science (1967) (131)
The Covenant of Reason - Rationality and the Commitments of Thought (1997) (111)
Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment (1985) (92)
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing - Changing Beliefs through Inquiry (1991) (90)
Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments (1960) (89)
Who commits the base rate fallacy? (1983) (85)
For the Sake of the Argument - Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (2007) (85)
On the Seriousness of Mistakes (1962) (76)
Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test (1988) (65)
The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg (1986) (64)
Inferences from multinomial data: Learning about a bag of marbles - Discussion (1996) (63)
Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates? (1981) (56)
The Covenant Of Reason (1997) (56)
The Demons of Decision (1987) (51)
For The Sake Of The Argument (1996) (50)
Deductive Cogency in Inductive Inference (1965) (48)
Rationality, Prediction, And Autonomous Choice (1993) (48)
Information and inference (2004) (47)
Newcomb’s Many Problems (1975) (47)
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing (2009) (47)
Pareto Unanimity and Consensus (1990) (43)
Extensions of Expected Utility Theory and Some Limitations of Pairwise Comparisons (2003) (42)
Money Pumps and Diachronic Books (2002) (40)
Consequentialism and sequential choice (1997) (35)
Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief (2004) (35)
TRUTH, FALLIBILITY AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE* (1983) (34)
Belief and Disposition (1978) (34)
A Note on Newcombmania (1982) (30)
Decisions and Revisions - Philosophical Essays on Knowledge and Value (1984) (29)
CORROBORATION AND RULES OF ACCEPTANCE (1963) (29)
Amartya Sen (2004) (27)
Consensus as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry (2004) (27)
Pragmatism and Change of View (1998) (26)
Imprecise and Indeterminate Probabilities (2000) (24)
Two notions of epistemic validity (1996) (22)
Decision Theory and Confirmation (1961) (21)
Conflict and Social Agency (1982) (21)
Decisions and revisions: Potential surprise: its role in inference and decision making (1984) (20)
Statistical and Inductive Probabilities (1963) (20)
Ignorance, probability and rational choice (1982) (19)
Identity and Conflict (2007) (19)
Direct Inference and Confirmational Conditionalization (1981) (19)
Inference and Logic According to Peirce (1997) (18)
Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment (2006) (18)
Pragmatism and Inquiry: Selected Essays (2012) (18)
ILLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAINTY* (1985) (18)
Why indeterminate probability is rational (2009) (17)
Value Commitments, Value Conflict, and the Separability of Belief and Value (1999) (17)
Advising Rational Agents (1997) (17)
Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference (1995) (14)
How Many Questions (1983) (13)
List and Pettit (2004) (13)
Probability Logic and Logical Probability (2007) (12)
Decisions and revisions: Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge (1984) (12)
Contracting From Epistemic Hell is Routine (2003) (11)
Belief and Action (1964) (11)
Meinong ’ s Theory of Objects (11)
The impossibility of inductive probability (1984) (11)
Utilitarianism and beyond: Liberty and welfare (1982) (10)
Coherence, regularity and conditional probability (1978) (10)
Probability and Evidence (1970) (10)
CONTRACTION AND INFORMATIONAL VALUE (1998) (10)
Beware of Syllogism: Statistical Reasoning and Conjecturing According to Peirce (2004) (9)
Compromising Bayesianism: a plea for indeterminacy (1990) (9)
Inductive Expansion and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (2001) (9)
SUPPORT AND SURPRISE: L. J. COHEN'S VIEW OF INDUCTIVE PROBABILITY* (1979) (9)
Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and Shafer (1978) (9)
Fallacy and controversy about base rates (1996) (8)
The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth (2005) (8)
The Weight of Argument (2011) (8)
Escape from Boredom: Edification According to Rorty (1981) (8)
Dewey’s logic of inquiry (2010) (8)
Conflict and Inquiry (1992) (8)
IF JONES ONLY KNEW MORE! (1969) (8)
Possibility and probability (1989) (8)
Epistemic Utility and the Evaluation of Experiments (1977) (7)
Between Logic and Intuition: The Logic of Full Belief (2000) (7)
Information and ignorance (1984) (7)
Direct Inference and Randomization (1982) (7)
DELIBERATION DOES CROWD OUT PREDICTION (2007) (7)
Hacking Salmon on Induction (1965) (6)
Symbolic algebra by computer - Applications to structural mechanics (1971) (6)
Counterexamples to Recovery and the Filtering Condition (2003) (6)
Four Themes in Statistical Explanation (1988) (6)
Decisions and revisions: Abduction and demands for information (1984) (6)
The Wrong Box (1983) (6)
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: EXPANSION (1991) (5)
Reply to Maher (1989) (5)
Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive support (2009) (5)
Putnam's three truth values (1959) (5)
Certainty, Probability and the Correction of Evidence* (1971) (5)
The Covenant of Reason: Prediction, deliberation, and correlated equilibrium (1997) (5)
Undercutting and the Ramsey test for conditionals (1994) (5)
Messianic vs Myopic Realism (1984) (5)
Knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction: Feasibility (1992) (4)
Are statistical hypotheses covering laws? (1969) (4)
Probabilistic pettifoggery (1986) (4)
Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984 (2010) (4)
But Fair to Chance (1973) (4)
Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated Equilibrium (1998) (4)
Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers (2008) (3)
Truth, Content, and Ties (1971) (3)
A complete characterization of a notion of contraction based on information-value (2004) (3)
Decision, probability, and utility: On indeterminate probabilities (1988) (3)
Inductive inference as ampliative and non monotonic reasoning (2005) (2)
Indeterminate Probability and Change of View (2002) (2)
Estimation and error free information (1986) (2)
Cognitive Value and the Advancement of ScienceThe Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions (1995) (2)
How to Fix a Prior (1994) (2)
How Infallible but Corrigible Full Belief Is Possible (2016) (2)
Rationality and Commitment (1994) (2)
The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and commitment (1997) (2)
Probability Exists (But Just Barely) (1986) (2)
Deductive closure (2011) (2)
Schick (2004) (2)
Probability Kinematics* (1967) (2)
Corrigibilism without Solidarity (2004) (2)
Making it Explicit by Robert B. Brandom (1996) (2)
Beware of Syllogism (2004) (2)
Knowledge as True Belief (2011) (2)
Decisions and revisions: Deductive cogency in inductive inference (1984) (1)
Newcomb's many problems (1975) (1)
Probabilistic Metaphysics. Patrick Suppes (1988) (1)
Rationality and Freedom (Book) (2004) (1)
Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality (2006) (1)
Reply to Maher and Kashima (1991) (1)
Changing Probability Judgements (1994) (1)
THE UTILITY OF PLEASURE IS A PAIN FOR DECISION THEORY* (2016) (1)
The Second Worst in Practical Conflict (2004) (1)
The ethics of controversy (1997) (1)
Degrees of Belief (2008) (1)
Belief, Doubt, and Evidentialism (2008) (1)
Kyburg on Random Designators (1983) (1)
A Paradox for the Birds (1976) (1)
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: INTRODUCTION (1991) (1)
The evolutionary matrix of deliberation according to Halldén (2008) (1)
Four Types of Ignorance (2016) (1)
Recent work in probability and induction (review article) (1966) (1)
Decisions and revisions: Direct inference (1984) (0)
Gaifman (2004) (0)
Deductive closure (2011) (0)
Evidentiary mechanisms and routine expansion (2008) (0)
Perception as Input and as Reason for Action (1995) (0)
Seidenfeld (2004) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Epistemic utility and the evaluation of experiments (1984) (0)
For the Sake of the Argument: Unextended Ramsey Tests (1996) (0)
05321 - Panel on belief change (2005) (0)
Modality without Modal Ontology (1996) (0)
Key Terms in Ontology: Nonexistence. History of the Problem of Nonexistent Objects (2021) (0)
In Memoriam: James J. Walsh (2003) (0)
Inductivism and Parmenidean epistemology: Kyburg's way (2012) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Preface (1984) (0)
Induction, Abduction, and Oracles (2012) (0)
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Notes (1991) (0)
Convexity and Separability in Representing Consensus (2008) (0)
Comments on ‘Linguistically Invariant Inductive Logic’ by Ian Hacking (1970) (0)
Information and error (1983) (0)
Reasoning: Belief, Doubt, and Evidentialism (2008) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Escape from boredom: edification according to Rorty (1984) (0)
Knowledge as True Full Belief (2012) (0)
VALUES IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (1986) (0)
Supposition and Belief Change (2004) (0)
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (1986) (0)
UNCERTAINTY AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT (1986) (0)
The American Pragmatists, by Cheryl Misak, The Oxford History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xvi + 286 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-923120-1 hb £25 (2014) (0)
Hard Choices: CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY (1986) (0)
Abstracts from Synthese (1970) (0)
Contraction, Rational Choice and Economy (2004) (0)
Introduction (2012) (0)
Inquiry, Deliberation, and Method (2007) (0)
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning by Gilbert Harman (1987) (0)
Normality and Expectation (1996) (0)
Agents and Automata (1996) (0)
Hard Choices: UTILITARIANISM AND CONFLICT (1986) (0)
Abstracts from Synthese (1970) (0)
Base Contraction and the Filtering Condition (2004) (0)
The Theory of Obiects uv (2008) (0)
Science and Scepticism by John Watkins (1986) (0)
Carol Rovane (2004) (0)
Howard Stein (2004) (0)
Back Matter (1990) (0)
HEDGING ACCEPTANCE (1994) (0)
Consensus, Rationality and Pareto Unanimity (1992) (0)
Matters of Degree (1996) (0)
Aspects of Conditional Logic (1996) (0)
Response To Scheffler (1983) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Corroboration and rules of acceptance (1984) (0)
For the Sake of the Argument: Nonmonotonicity in Belief Change and Suppositional Reasoning (1996) (0)
Confirmation, linguistic invariance, and conceptual innovation (1969) (0)
OBLIGATION AND PERMISSION WHEN THERE IS A SECOND BEST AND WHEN THERE IS A SECOND WORST (2006) (0)
Informational Value in Contraction (2004) (0)
Comment on “on some statistical paradoxes and non-conglomerability” by Bruce Hill (1981) (0)
Cognitive Value and the Advancement of Science (2017) (0)
Some Problems with Infinity (2004) (0)
Response To Margalit (1983) (0)
Knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction: Elicitation for games (1992) (0)
IN MEMORIAM: SIDNEY MORGENBESSER (2004) (0)
To ground judgments of credal probability on knowledge of chance via direct inference, one should appeal to the information about chances (2007) (0)
Philosophy of Science.The Structure of Scientific Thought: An Introduction to Philosophy of (1961) (0)
Objective Modality and Direct Inference (2001) (0)
Final version at Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0754-9 CONDITIONAL CHOICE WITH A VACUOUS SECOND TIER (2016) (0)
VALUES REVEALED BY CHOICES (1986) (0)
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: References (1991) (0)
Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic (1970) (0)
The Pragmatism of Isaac Levi (2015) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Bibliography of Isaac Levi (1984) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Conflict and social agency (1984) (0)
CHOICE AND FOREKNOWLEDGE (1986) (0)
CHANGES OF MIND : BELIEFS AND VALUE (2007) (0)
Decisions and revisions: Must the scientist make value judgements? (1984) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Isaac Levi?

Isaac Levi is affiliated with the following schools:

Columbia University