Jennifer F. Reinganum | Academic Influence

Jennifer F. Reinganum's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Economics

#2210

World Rank

#2525

Historical Rank

#841

USA Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Jennifer F. Reinganum's Degrees

PhD Economics University of Chicago
Bachelors Economics University of California, Berkeley

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Why Is Jennifer F. Reinganum Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Jennifer F. Reinganum is an American economist. She lives in Nashville, Tennessee where she is the E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University. She has been a professor of economics since 1995. Reinganum was the president of the American Law and Economics Association for 2012 and has received multiple grant awards from the National Science Foundation.

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Jennifer F. Reinganum's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Innovation and Industry Evolution (1985) (1107)
The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion (1989) (999)
Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly (1982) (867)
On the diffusion of new technology: A game theoretic approach (1981) (535)
A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion (1979) (496)
Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs (1986) (466)
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK (1985) (461)
The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement (1986) (419)
Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology (1981) (369)
A DYNAMIC GAME OF R AND D: PATENT PROTECTION AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR' (1982) (364)
Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance (1986) (314)
Dynamic games of innovation (1981) (306)
Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion (1986) (223)
Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games (1985) (218)
Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling (1994) (187)
Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R and D (1983) (111)
On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence and Equilibrium Bias (2000) (108)
Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling (2007) (93)
Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency (1994) (92)
A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide (1982) (90)
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling (2005) (88)
Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information (1983) (88)
Settlement (2008) (81)
Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity (2010) (78)
Appealing Judgments (1999) (78)
A two-stage model of research and development with endogenous second-mover advantages (1985) (74)
A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance (1988) (73)
Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation (1993) (71)
Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly When There is Universal Private Information (2004) (66)
Secrecy and Safety (2003) (66)
Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners (1991) (62)
Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining (2005) (60)
Strategic Search Theory (1982) (57)
Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bargaining (2000) (57)
Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory (2011) (57)
Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game (1994) (55)
Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts (1999) (55)
Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court (1995) (52)
Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability (2002) (49)
Markets, Torts and Social Inefficiency (2003) (41)
The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement (2013) (40)
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure (2006) (40)
Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Reply (1984) (35)
Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition (1995) (34)
Hush Money (1999) (34)
Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases (2014) (33)
Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets (2011) (30)
Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases (2000) (30)
Speaking up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review (2002) (30)
Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signaling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining (2002) (28)
Nash Equilibrium Search for the Best Alternative (1983) (27)
Search Equilibrium with Endogenous Recall (1992) (26)
Endogenous availability in search equilibrium (1991) (24)
The Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games (1981) (21)
Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade (2001) (17)
MICROECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R&D (2007) (14)
A Dynamic Model of Lawsuit Joinder and Settlement (2009) (14)
Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care (2013) (14)
Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models (2013) (12)
Evidence Suppression by Prosecutors: Violations of the Brady Rule (2018) (10)
Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment (2014) (9)
An Equilibrium Model of Tax Compliance with a Bayesian Auditor and some 'Honest' Taxpayers (1984) (8)
Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Comnpliance: A Strategic Analysis (1989) (7)
Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial (2007) (7)
Settlement and Trial (2017) (7)
Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information (2006) (7)
A formal theory of lobbying behaviour (1983) (6)
Search, bargaining, and signalling in the market for legal services (2013) (6)
The Economics of Income Taxation: Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework (1983) (6)
Hidden Talents: Entrepreneurship and Pareto-Improving Private Information (2009) (5)
Market Structure, Liability, and Product Safety (2016) (5)
Credibility and Law Enforcement (1986) (5)
Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer. Comment (2008) (4)
Search, Bargaining, and Agency in the Market for Legal Services (2010) (4)
Selecting among Acquitted Defendants: Procedural Choice versus Selective Compensation (2016) (4)
Sequential Equilibrium Detection and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Evasion (1984) (4)
Settlement, Deterrence and the Economics of Punitive Damages Reform (1997) (4)
Reducing Unjust Convictions: Plea Bargaining, Trial, and Evidence Disclosure (2020) (4)
Dynamic games of R&D with rivalry (1979) (4)
Privacy, Publicity, and Choice (2008) (3)
A note on the strategic adoption of a new technology (1983) (3)
A Note on Multiple Equilibria and Punitive Damages Rules in "Everybody Out of the Pool" (1998) (2)
Research and Development with a Generalized Hazard Function (1983) (2)
Reducing Unjust Convictions: Plea Bargaining, Trial, and Evidence Suppression/Disclosure (2018) (2)
A SIGNALLING MODEL OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES IN SETTLEMENT BARGAINING (2002) (1)
Prosecutor Quality, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform (2021) (1)
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL (1998) (1)
Information Suppression by Teams and Violations of the Brady Rule (2016) (1)
Experimentation , Patents , and Innovation (2010) (1)
Is Silence Golden? Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability (1999) (1)
A Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Auditors (1984) (1)
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 PR ACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF R AND D (2017) (0)
Fee-shifting with Two-sided Asymmetric Information (2015) (0)
American Economic Association Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion (2017) (0)
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (2008) (0)
Confidentiality and the Market Provision of Safety (2005) (0)
On the Determination of Roles in Bargaining Models: Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information (1991) (0)
Strategic Lobbying Behavior (1980) (0)
Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality (2016) (0)
Settlement and Litigation Under Alternative Legal Systems (1985) (0)
Market structure, liability, and product safety: Applications (2016) (0)
Enforcement Malfeasance, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform (2020) (0)
A Note on Rational Threats and Competitive Equilibrium (1980) (0)
Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency (2010) (0)
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES A REVIEW OF AND AS IT RELATES TO ECONOMIC THEORY* supported in part by NSF Grant #SESS0-03863. (2008) (0)

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