Joel Sobel | Academic Influence

Joel Sobel's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Joel Sobel

Economics

#2519

World Rank

#2874

Historical Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Joel Sobel's Degrees

Bachelors Economics University of California, Berkeley

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Why Is Joel Sobel Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Joel Sobel is an American economist and currently professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego. His research focuses on game theory and has been seminal in the field of strategic communication in economic games. His work with Vincent Crawford established the game-theoretic concept of cheap talk.

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Joel Sobel's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION (1982) (4023)
Can We Trust Social Capital (2002) (1056)
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (1987) (922)
INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND RECIPROCITY (2005) (906)
A Theory of Credibility (1985) (618)
Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist (1984) (363)
Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games (1990) (358)
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder (1987) (350)
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie (2016) (317)
A Multistage Model of Bargaining (1983) (296)
The Timing of Sales (1984) (279)
Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria (2008) (238)
DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY WITH ENTRY OF NEW CONSUMERS (1991) (191)
Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies (1993) (176)
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION (1995) (170)
Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (1999) (162)
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium (2008) (157)
A Model of Positive Self-Image in Subjective Assessments (2005) (146)
Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication (1993) (133)
A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining (1983) (133)
Signaling Games (2009) (118)
Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem (1981) (109)
An Analysis of Discovery Rules (1989) (98)
On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics (1992) (97)
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Giving and Receiving Advice (2013) (94)
Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem (1993) (79)
Economists' Models of Learning (2000) (77)
Evolutionary stability and efficiency (1993) (60)
For Better or Forever: Formal versus Informal Enforcement (2006) (46)
Lying and Deception in Games (2020) (45)
Game-theoretic models of bargaining: Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: Who should bear the burden of proof? (1985) (44)
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical (1991) (44)
Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism (1998) (40)
How to Count to One Thousand (1992) (37)
Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games (1995) (37)
Chapter 25 Signalling (1994) (35)
Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements (1993) (34)
On the Dynamics of Standards (1998) (32)
Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation (2015) (31)
On the relationship between individual and group decisions (2014) (29)
Min, Max, and Sum (2000) (27)
A Re-Examination of Yardstick Competition (1997) (26)
Generous actors, selfish actions: markets with other-regarding preferences (2009) (23)
Complexity versus conflict in communication (2012) (22)
Information Aggregation and Grojp Decisions (2006) (22)
A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity (2008) (22)
Ten possible experiments on communication and deception (2013) (19)
Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games (1990) (19)
Flaws in the Efficiency Gap (2017) (18)
Non-linear prices and price-taking behavior (1984) (17)
A Model of Declining Standards (1997) (17)
Bargaining, Strategic Reserves, and International Trade in Exhaustible Resources (1984) (16)
A Theory of Auditing and Plunder (1985) (16)
OF NEW CONSUMERS (1991) (14)
Broad Terms and Organizational Codes ∗ (2016) (13)
On the Robustness of Informative Cheap Talk ∗ (2007) (13)
Persuasion with costly precision (2021) (12)
On optimal distribution of output from a jointly owned resource (1982) (12)
AccuWeather (2008) (11)
Do Markets Make People Selfish ? ∗ (2007) (10)
Effective communication in cheap-talk games (2010) (9)
Is anything safe to eat? (2001) (9)
A note on pre-play communication (2017) (9)
Breeding and raiding: A theory of strategic production of skills (1983) (8)
Proportional distribution schemes (1981) (7)
Fair Division of a Random Harvest: The Finite Case (1979) (6)
The Review of Economic Studies, Ltd. (2012) (6)
ReGale: Some memorable results (2009) (5)
Fair Allocations of a Renewable Resource (1979) (4)
Neuroeconomics: A Comment on Bernheim (2009) (4)
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games (2019) (4)
How (and When) to Communicate with Enemies (1992) (3)
Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria (2007) (2)
What Makes Money Work? Comments on “The Guidance of an Enterprise Economy” (2018) (2)
It’s Not What You Know, It’s Who You Play (1991) (2)
Putting altruism in context (2002) (2)
Simultaneous Versus Sequential Disclosure ∗ (2019) (1)
NOTES, COMMENTS, AND LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Economists' Models of Learning 1 (2000) (1)
Forecasting Group Decisions from Individual Behavior : Impossibility Results ∗ (2012) (1)
Solo Strikes : Do Empty Alleys Lead to Unsafe Streets ? (2007) (0)
Sobel : Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity 393 (2000) (0)
The Berkeley Memorial (2009) (0)
What are the Costs of Lies (2017) (0)
A Multistage Model of Bargaining Author ( s ) : (2007) (0)
MONOPOLY AND PRODUCT SELECTION (1980) (0)
Iterative Weak Dominance and Interval-Dominance (2016) (0)
The Timing of Sales (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, L1 (1984), p.353-368.) (1982) (0)
BEAN COUNTING: STANDARD CHOICE IN A TWO-DIMENSIONAL INCENTIVE PROBLEM (1996) (0)
Getting Permission (2022) (0)
American Economic Association Can We Trust Social Capital ? (2017) (0)
In memoriam: David Gale (1921-2008) (2009) (0)
Signaling Without Handicap (2007) (0)
Duke University School of Law An Analysis of Discovery Rules (2007) (0)
Min, Max, and Sum - eScholarship (2000) (0)
THEORIES OF DECLINING STANDARDS BY JOEL SOBEL (1996) (0)
Parag Pathak: Winner of the 2018 Clark Medal (2019) (0)
An Evolutionary Analysis of Games with Pre-Play Communication (2003) (0)
Agricultural & Applied Economics Association (2012) (0)
The Review of Economic Studies , Ltd . The Timing of Sales (2007) (0)
Southwest Economic Theory Conference (2001) (0)
5525 Institutions , Shared Guilt , and Moral Transgression (2015) (0)
Gale, David (1921–2008) (2008) (0)
What Makes Money Work? (2018) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Joel Sobel?

Joel Sobel is affiliated with the following schools: