Kenneth Shepsle

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Kenneth Shepsle

Kenneth Shepsle is affiliated with the following schools: University of California, Berkeley, University of Rochester, Harvard University

Kenneth Shepsle's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Kenneth Shepsle

Political Science

#1367

World Rank

#1644

Historical Rank

political-science Degrees

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Political Science

Kenneth Shepsle's Degrees

Bachelors Political Science University of California, Berkeley

Why Is Kenneth Shepsle Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Kenneth Shepsle is an American political scientist who is influential for rational choice scholarship. He is George D. Markham professor of government at Harvard University, and a research associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science there. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the National Academy of Sciences.

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Kenneth Shepsle's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics (1981) (1699)
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models (1979) (1268)
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power (1987) (959)
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice (1981) (699)
Politics in plural societies : a theory of democratic instability (1974) (607)
Studying Institutions (1989) (598)
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization (1981) (528)
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition (1972) (514)
Positive theories of congressional institutions (1994) (465)
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy: REFLECTIONS ON THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS (1990) (446)
Coalitions and Cabinet Government (1990) (410)
Rational Choice Institutionalism (2008) (383)
Decision Making and Problem Solving (1987) (375)
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions (1984) (371)
Institutions and Strategy in Parliamentary Democracy: A Review Article@@@Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France@@@Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (1998) (313)
Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (1994) (261)
The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House. (1979) (221)
Why are Congressional Committees Powerful? (1987) (183)
Political Solutions to Market Problems (1984) (164)
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style (1985) (160)
The giant jigsaw puzzle (1978) (152)
When Do Rules of Procedure Matter? (1984) (142)
Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies": Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs (1989) (139)
Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process (1973) (131)
Models of multiparty electoral competition (2002) (121)
Events, equilibria and government survival (1998) (109)
The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry (1987) (100)
Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics (1990) (99)
U. S. Congressman as Enterprise (1981) (92)
Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey (1992) (90)
The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics. (2009) (88)
Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications (1982) (80)
Divided Government: America is Not “Exceptional” (1991) (72)
Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825 (1989) (63)
Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind (1981) (60)
On the Size of Winning Coalitions (1974) (56)
Is Negative Voting an Artifact (1989) (53)
Movers, Stayers, and Registration: Why Age is Correlated with Registration in the U.S (2012) (53)
A Comment on Institutional Change (2001) (52)
Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court (2007) (52)
How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: (1999) (51)
Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited (2008) (51)
Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off (1988) (49)
American Government: Power and Purpose (2002) (47)
Congressional committee assignments (1975) (46)
Political Economy Models of Elections (2011) (43)
Cabinet ministers and government formation in parliamentary democracies (1994) (43)
The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models (1986) (42)
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting: Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections (1990) (41)
Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority Randomization in the U.S. House of Representatives. (2009) (41)
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation: Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy (1999) (41)
Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics (1982) (40)
A Note on Zeckhauser's “Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives”: The Case of the Paradox of Voting (1970) (38)
Losers in Politics (and How They Sometimes Become Winners): William Riker's Heresthetic (2003) (36)
Understanding Government Survival: Empirical Exploration or Analytical Models? (1999) (36)
Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements (2006) (33)
The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups (1990) (32)
Working and Shirking: Equilibrium in Public Goods Games with Overlapping Generations of Players (2001) (32)
Making and Breaking Governments: Governments and parliaments (1996) (32)
Ministrables and Government Formation: Munchkins, Players and Big Beasts of the Jungle (2000) (29)
Cabinet government in theoretical perspective (1994) (28)
Political Entrepreneurship and Patterns of Democratic Instability in Plural Societies (1971) (27)
The private use of public interest (1980) (26)
Rule Breaking and Political Imagination (2017) (26)
The Changing Value of Seniority in the U.S. House: Conditional Party Government Revised (2014) (22)
Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures (2010) (21)
The Nature of Contemporary Political Science: A Roundtable Discussion (1990) (20)
Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government (1987) (20)
Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules (2015) (20)
Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock (2012) (17)
The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism (2007) (17)
Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures (1985) (16)
12. L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik. “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review 48 (1954): 787–92 Cited 360 times. (2006) (15)
Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part I (2008) (15)
Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment (2019) (14)
Majority Cycling and Agenda Manipulation: Richard McKelvey's Contributions and Legacy (2007) (14)
Agency Design and Political Control (13)
Policy Consequences of Government by Congressional Subcommittees (1985) (13)
Government Formation and Survival: A Rejoinder to Warwick's Reply (1999) (13)
Nominations for Sale (2009) (13)
Statistical political philosphy and positive political theory (1995) (13)
Making and Breaking Governments: Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies (1996) (12)
Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part II (2008) (11)
The political economy of state reform - political to the core (1999) (11)
Political Deals in Institutional Settings (1996) (11)
The failure of congressional budgeting (1983) (11)
Bargaining in Legislatures with Overlapping Generations of Politicians * (2003) (10)
Rules, Restrictions, Constraints: Structure and Process in the New Institutional Economics (1998) (9)
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy: Notes (1990) (8)
Agenda formation and cabinet government (1993) (8)
A theory of minority government in parliamentary democracy (1990) (7)
Executive Absolutism: A Model (2020) (7)
Agenda Setting Power in Organizations With Overlapping Generations of Players (2003) (7)
Advice and Consent in the 60-Vote Senate (2007) (6)
The Rules of the Game: What Rules? Which Game? (2016) (6)
Election results and coalition possibilities in Ireland (1992) (5)
Explaining Institutional Change: Soaking, Poking, and Modeling in the U.S. Congress (1997) (5)
Viewpoint: The Budget: Will a Constitutional Amendment Help? (1982) (5)
3. Electoral Systems and Minority Representation (1995) (5)
William Harrison Riker (2001) (5)
William Harrison Riker (2001) (5)
Minimum Winning Coalitions Reconsidered: A Rejoinder to Butterworth's “Comment” (1974) (5)
Endogenous Assembly Rules, Senior Agenda Power, and Incumbency Advantage (2014) (4)
Arguments about Theory...Again (2006) (4)
Making and Breaking Governments: Party systems and cabinet stability (1996) (4)
Elinor Ostrom: uncommon (2010) (4)
Positive political economy (2001) (3)
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance@@@Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (1992) (3)
The Analysis of Political Cleavages . By Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. 152. $10.00.) (1971) (3)
American Government: Power and Purpose, 11th edition (2010) (3)
Endogenous agendas and seniority advantage (2012) (3)
Portfolio allocation and government formation in Europe and Japan (1996) (3)
Perspectives on Political Economy. (1991) (3)
Executive Absolutism: The Dynamics of Authority Acquisition in a System of Separated Powers (2019) (3)
Institution-Induced Stability (2019) (2)
Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress (review) (2003) (2)
Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and (2008) (2)
The Compensation of Public Officials as a Campaign Issue: An Economic Analysis of Brown v. Hartlage (1983) (2)
The Rules of the Game (2014) (2)
[Macroeconomics and Politics]: Comment (1988) (2)
American Government : Power and Purpose, 13/E. (2016) (2)
Mobility, Mobilization, and Registration: A Generational Model (2010) (2)
The Politics of Regulation. James Q. Wilson (1982) (2)
A Comment on the Positive Canons Project (1994) (2)
Official Errors and Official Liability (1978) (2)
Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory (2017) (2)
RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATIONS OF SOCIAL FACTS (2010) (1)
William H. Riker: A Brief Intellectual Biography of the President-Elect (1982) (1)
Rational choice politics (2009) (1)
Making and Breaking Governments: Government formation, intraparty politics, and administrative reform (1996) (1)
Introduction: Rational Choice Classics in Political Science (2009) (1)
Reforming the State: Politcal to the Core (1999) (1)
Membership Turnover and Congressional Reform: The More Things Change, the More They May or May Not Stay the Same (1977) (1)
Remembering Kenneth Arrow: discount rates (2019) (1)
12. L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik. American Political Science Review 48 (1954): 787 92 Cited 360 times. (2006) (1)
The social context of government formation (1996) (0)
Making the model more realistic (1996) (0)
A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation (1996) (0)
Bureaucracy, constitutional arrangements and the State (2009) (0)
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy: References (1990) (0)
Remembering Kenneth Arrow: discount rates (2018) (0)
Predicting Politicsby Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2003) (0)
Courts, Models, and the New Institutionalism (2007) (0)
JPS volume 44 issue 4 Cover and Back matter (2014) (0)
Making and Breaking Governments: Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992–1993 (1996) (0)
Cabinet ministers and government formation: a research agenda (1994) (0)
Exploring the model: A comparative perspective (1996) (0)
A Behavioral Theory of Elections . By Bendor, Diermeier, Siegel, and Ting. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 264p. $70.00 cloth, $24.95 paper. (2012) (0)
Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock (2012) (0)
Making and Breaking Governments: The government formation process (1996) (0)
How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change (review) (2005) (0)
Social choice, equilibrium and electoral systems (2009) (0)
Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics . By Axelrod Robert. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 216. $8.95.) (1970) (0)
of Congressional Institutions (2016) (0)
Back Matter (1995) (0)
MICHAEL DWECK and GREGORY KERSHAW (Directors). The Truffle Hunters. Written by Michael Dweck and Gregory Kershaw. Produced by Michael Dweck and Gregory Kershaw. Distributed by Sony Pictures Classics, 2021, 1 h 24 min. (2022) (0)
Voting, elections and pressure politics (2009) (0)
Information, Institutions and, Constitutional Arrangements The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters (2011) (0)
William H. Riker (2011) (0)
Rational Choice Politics (Sage 2009), 4 vols. (2009) (0)
The Discount Rate for Public Investments: Should the Government Really Be Different?* (1977) (0)
Making and Breaking Governments: Theory, institutions, and government formation (1996) (0)
American Government: A Brief Introduction (2018) (0)
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES and the Possibility of a Science of Politics SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 364 (2017) (0)
The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms. By Barry M. Mitnick. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. xxv + 506. $20.00.) (1981) (0)
The Logic of Collective Choice, Thomas Schwartz, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, xiv + 315 pages (1988) (0)
Strategy, structure and procedure in legislatures (1985) (0)
Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization (1996) (0)
An Electoral Theory of Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules (2014) (0)
The American Congress Reader: The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power (2008) (0)
Political Strategies and Nonconvergence (2005) (0)
Democratizing the Senate from Within (2021) (0)
Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation (1996) (0)
[no title] (1972) (0)

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Other Resources About Kenneth Shepsle

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Kenneth Shepsle?

Kenneth Shepsle is affiliated with the following schools:

Kenneth Shepsle's Academic­Influence.com Rankings