Marilda Sotomayor | Academic Influence

Marilda Sotomayor's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Marilda Sotomayor

Economics

#2054

World Rank

#2349

Historical Rank

Social Choice Theory

#8

World Rank

#9

Historical Rank

Mathematical Economics

#10

World Rank

#11

Historical Rank

Microeconomics

#187

World Rank

#198

Historical Rank

economics Degrees

Marilda Sotomayor

Mathematics

#3285

World Rank

#4881

Historical Rank

Game Theory

#15

World Rank

#17

Historical Rank

Graph Theory

#108

World Rank

#116

Historical Rank

Measure Theory

#2862

World Rank

#3403

Historical Rank

mathematics Degrees

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Economics
Mathematics

Marilda Sotomayor's Degrees

PhD Economics University of São Paulo
Masters Mathematics University of São Paulo
Bachelors Mathematics University of São Paulo

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Why Is Marilda Sotomayor Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor is a Brazilian mathematician and economist known for her research on auction theory and stable matchings. She is a member of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, Brazilian Society of Econometrics, and Brazilian Society of Mathematics. She was elected fellow of the Econometric Society in 2003 and international honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2020.

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Marilda Sotomayor's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (1990) (2197)
Two-sided matching (1990) (716)
Multi-Item Auctions (1986) (636)
Some remarks on the stable matching problem (1985) (439)
Game Theory, Introduction to (2009) (213)
Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem (1985) (213)
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem (1999) (154)
The College Admissions Problem Revisited (1989) (150)
A further note on the stable matching problem (1987) (91)
The Multiple Partners Game (1992) (77)
The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game (1999) (76)
The assignment game (1990) (76)
A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages (1996) (65)
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market (2004) (59)
Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game (2007) (48)
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market (2000) (34)
Chapter 16 Two-sided matching (1992) (34)
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets (1988) (32)
On income fluctuations and capital gains (1984) (32)
Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism (2003) (32)
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure (2002) (32)
A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers (2003) (31)
Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game (2003) (30)
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (2008) (28)
The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences (2011) (27)
A Simultaneous Descending Bid Auction for Multiple Items and Unitary Demand (2002) (20)
Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment (1996) (19)
A further note on the college admission game (2012) (13)
Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game (2009) (11)
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf (2005) (11)
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets (2017) (11)
A note on the multiple partners assignment game (2010) (10)
Two-Sided Matching Models (2009) (5)
On income fluctuations and capital gains with a convex production function (1987) (5)
Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market (2007) (4)
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept (2016) (4)
One-to-one Matching: the Marriage Model (1990) (3)
LABOR TIME SHARED IN THE ASSIGNMENT GAME LENDING NEW INSIGHTS TO THE THEORY OF TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS (2012) (3)
My encounters with David Gale (2009) (3)
Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games (2010) (2)
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game (2019) (2)
Buying and selling strategies in the assignment game (2003) (2)
Adjusting prices in the many-to-many assignment game (2008) (2)
The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically (2017) (1)
Two-Sided Matching: Stable matchings (1990) (1)
Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication (2019) (1)
THE ROOLE PLAYED BY THE WELL-BEHAVED MATCHINGS IN THE COALITION FORMATION PROCESS OF THE STABLE MATCHINGS FOR THE ROOMMATE MARKET (2016) (1)
Resultados de estática comparativa para um mercado de matching misto de dois lados (2005) (1)
ON THE CORE OF THE COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE PAYOFF AND FINITE SET OF PLAYERS (2012) (1)
LABOR TIME SHARED IN THE ASSIGNMENT GAME GENERATING NEW COOPERATIVE AND COMPETITIVE STRUCTURES (2013) (1)
A Dynamic Market Clearing Price Mechanism with Multiple Demands (2005) (0)
A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday (2008) (0)
The structure of the set of stable matchings (1990) (0)
Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core (2023) (0)
The Role Played By Simple Outcomes In Coalition Formation Process Of The Core Outcomes (2012) (0)
A further note on the college admission game (2011) (0)
THE COMPETITIVE MULTIPLE-PARTNERS ASSIGNMENT GAME (2003) (0)
Two-Sided Matching: Bibliography (1990) (0)
Many-to-one matching: models in which firms may employ many workers (1990) (0)
Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money (2013) (0)
Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets (2021) (0)
Two-Sided Matching: Models of one-to-one matching with money as a continuous variable (1990) (0)
On Simple Outcomes and Cores (2016) (0)
REACHING THE CORE THROUGH A RANDOM STABLE ALLOCATION MECHANISM (2006) (0)
The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically (2016) (0)
Paper / Document de travail du personnel 2017 ‐ 4 Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two ‐ Sided Markets with Weak Preferences (2017) (0)
Two-Sided Matching: A simple model of one seller and many buyers (1990) (0)
Michael Maschler, a special friend (2008) (0)
Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands (1999) (0)
A Selling Mechanism (2003) (0)
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets (2017) (0)
Two-Sided Matching: Open questions and research directions (1990) (0)
A Dynamic Price-Setting Mechanism for a Hybrid Matching Market (2003) (0)
The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns (1990) (0)
A generalization of the assignment model (1990) (0)
Two-Sided Matching: Introduction (1990) (0)
Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets (2021) (0)
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept (2015) (0)
Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences (1990) (0)
Two Folk Manipulability Theorems In Two-Sided Matching Markets (2012) (0)
Conflict-free and Pareto-optimal Allocations in the One-sided Assignment Game: A Solution Concept Weaker than the Core (2019) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Marilda Sotomayor?

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