Oliver Hart | Academic Influence

Oliver Hart 's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Oliver Hart

Economics

#145

World Rank

#192

Historical Rank

#103

USA Rank

Microeconomics

#21

World Rank

#23

Historical Rank

#16

USA Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Oliver Hart 's Degrees

PhD Economics Princeton University

Why Is Oliver Hart Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Sir Oliver Simon D'Arcy Hart is a British-born American economist, currently the Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor at Harvard University. Together with Bengt R. Holmström, he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2016.

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Oliver Hart 's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986) (8869)
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1988) (5213)
The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation (1980) (2835)
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM (1983) (2813)
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital (1991) (1781)
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988) (1737)
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons (1996) (1734)
The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme (1983) (1436)
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives (1983) (1406)
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control (1987) (1325)
Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications (1995) (1253)
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt (1997) (1141)
Vertical integration and market foreclosure (1990) (984)
Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships (2002) (970)
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (1998) (921)
Debt Enforcement around the World (2006) (883)
Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids (1980) (813)
On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete (1975) (722)
Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm (1988) (624)
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics (1988) (473)
A Theory of Firm Scope (2002) (417)
A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features (1982) (415)
Financial Contracting (2001) (404)
Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) (1982) (263)
Different Approaches to Bankruptcy (2000) (249)
Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence (2008) (242)
The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership (1996) (225)
A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies (1979) (217)
Price Destabilizing Speculation (1986) (215)
On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries (1974) (210)
Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information (1983) (205)
Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment (1981) (194)
Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points (2007) (193)
On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model (1974) (177)
Monopolistic competition in a large economy with differentiated commodities (1979) (154)
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model (1985) (150)
Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn (1992) (148)
Bargaining and Strikes (1989) (141)
Incomplete Contracts and Control (2017) (126)
On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies (1979) (119)
Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership (1998) (115)
A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions (1996) (108)
The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information (1981) (107)
Economic Analysis of Markets and Games (1992) (100)
Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) (1983) (97)
CONTRACTS, REFERENCE POINTS, AND COMPETITION—BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION (2009) (89)
Theories of Optimal Capital Structure: A Managerial Discretion Perspective (1993) (87)
On The Profitability of Speculation (1977) (86)
Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley (2009) (77)
Incomplete contracts and ownership: Some new thoughts (2007) (77)
Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm (2011) (76)
How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? (2011) (66)
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN THE SPIRIT OF CHAMBERLIN: SPECIAL RESULTS (1985) (65)
Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation (1980) (62)
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks (1982) (54)
Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm (2008) (53)
Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations (1988) (45)
Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm (2007) (44)
Diversification , Systematic Risk , and Shareholder Return : A Capital Market Extension of Rumelt ' s 1974 Study (2008) (39)
More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts (2013) (38)
A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption (1975) (31)
Managerial Entrenchment and Debt Maturity : Theory and Evidence ∗ (2006) (30)
Some Negative Results on the Existence of Comparative Statics (Properties) in Portfolio Theory (1975) (30)
Vertical Integration and the Distribution of Property Rights (1987) (28)
Insolvency Reform in the U.K.: A Revised Proposal (1995) (26)
Improving Bankruptcy Procedure (1994) (22)
Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points (2011) (19)
Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium (1977) (17)
Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry (1985) (17)
Short-Term, Long-Term, and Continuing Contracts (2015) (12)
Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles (2019) (12)
A New Capital Requirement for Large Financial Institutions (2009) (11)
A Proposal for Bankruptcy Reform in the U.K. (1993) (11)
The Economics of Uncertainty (1982) (10)
Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction (1982) (9)
Take-over bids and the theory of the corporation (1978) (7)
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) (1998) (6)
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND RENEGOTIATION BY OLIVER HART AND (2007) (6)
Price Destabilizing Speculation (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (october 1986).) (1986) (5)
Proposal for a new bankruptcy procedure in emerging markets (1998) (4)
Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Point (2007) (4)
Continuing Contracts (2016) (4)
4 Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives (2007) (3)
Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) (1989) (3)
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) (1983) (3)
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) (1983) (3)
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) (1984) (2)
50th Anniversary of the Review of Economic Studies (1983) (1)
Insider Trading and Market Manipulations: Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium (1)
Contracts, Conflicts and Communication (2017) (1)
Noncontractible investments and reference points Games (2013) (1)
12-5-2006 Contracts as Reference Points (2013) (1)
Comment on Joseph Stiglitz's Paper «Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard» (1983) (1)
Private Sanctions (2022) (0)
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Working Paper Department of Economics Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm (0)
Mil. Libraries -dewey (2011) (0)
NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES THE ECONOMICS OF BANKRUPTCY REFORM (2002) (0)
The New Corporate Governance (2022) (0)
Production Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks (1992) (0)
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PRIVATE SANCTIONS (2022) (0)
The Review of Economic Studies Ltd . Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (2007) (0)
IZA DP No . 3889 Contracts as Reference Points : Experimental Evidence (2008) (0)
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MARKET POWER AND INCOME TAXATION (2019) (0)
John Hardman Moore and contractual incompleteness (2009) (0)
Number 1903 Different Approaches to Bankruptcy (1999) (0)
1 Contracts , Reference Points , and Competition – Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation 1 (2008) (0)
Date Due (2009) (0)
The Review of Economic Studies Ltd. (2010) (0)
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries of Economics Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation Nvimber 367 (2011) (0)
The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations (1978) (0)
Working Paper Department of Economics Procurement and Renegotiation (2011) (0)
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm article Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters (2007) (0)
Working Paper Department of Economics Priva Te and Public Suppl Y of Liquidity (2011) (0)
On Hart, Oliver, "Incomplete contracts, property rights, and theory of the firm: an introduction to Hart’s book" (1998) (0)
NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository (2001) (0)
Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts1 (2012) (0)
OLIN CENTER FOR LAW , ECONOMICS , AND BUSINESS STRATEGIC JUDGMENT PROOFING (2008) (0)

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