Paul Milgrom

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Paul Milgrom

Paul Milgrom is affiliated with the following schools: Yale University, Northwestern University , Stanford University

Paul Milgrom's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Paul Milgrom

Economics

#162

World Rank

#215

Historical Rank

#110

USA Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Paul Milgrom's Degrees

PhD Business Administration Stanford University
Masters Business Administration Stanford University

Why Is Paul Milgrom Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Paul Robert Milgrom is an American economist. He is the Shirley and Leonard Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences at the Stanford University School of Humanities and Sciences, a position he has held since 1987. He is a professor in the Stanford School of Engineering as well and a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Research. Milgrom is an expert in game theory, specifically auction theory and pricing strategies. He is the winner of the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, together with Robert B. Wilson, "for improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats".

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Paul Milgrom's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985) (5856)
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991) (5782)
Economics, Organization and Management (1992) (4483)
A theory of auctions and competitive bidding (1982) (4071)
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981) (3116)
The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization (1990) (2911)
AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES (1987) (2848)
Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing (1995) (2438)
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982) (2376)
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (1986) (2367)
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990) (1835)
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence☆ (1982) (1761)
Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge (1982) (1689)
Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) (1679)
Monotone Comparative Statics (1994) (1618)
The Firm as an Incentive System (1994) (1575)
The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant (1990) (1570)
Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (2002) (1242)
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (1985) (1121)
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (1994) (1116)
LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS' (1982) (1034)
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer (1989) (920)
Matching with Contracts (2005) (803)
The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain (2005) (797)
An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations (1988) (738)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (1999) (736)
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002) (730)
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design (1987) (677)
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2004) (646)
Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (1985) (608)
Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding (1981) (561)
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships (1990) (543)
Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes (1992) (520)
Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (1987) (466)
Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (1991) (366)
Economics, organization and management / Paul Milgrom, John Roberts (1992) (340)
The Promise of Prediction Markets (2008) (336)
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013) (330)
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004) (315)
Information and timing in repeated partnerships (1991) (309)
Core-selecting package auctions (2008) (294)
Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (1987) (293)
A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention (1991) (288)
The value of information in a sealed-bid auction (1982) (286)
Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information (1983) (281)
Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (1991) (241)
A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information (1979) (214)
Complementarity in Organizations (2012) (206)
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II (2000) (201)
AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF (1987) (197)
AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE (1981) (170)
Complementarities and systems : understanding japanese economic organization (1994) (157)
Economic theories of the firm: past, present, and future (1988) (150)
Communication and Inventory as Substitutes in Organizing Production (1988) (144)
Is Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the Contingent Valuation Method (1993) (136)
Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design (2010) (134)
The economic nature of the firm: Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity (2009) (128)
What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (2008) (128)
Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets (2001) (118)
Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization (1987) (107)
Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation (2014) (99)
The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (1990) (97)
Package Auctions and Exchanges (2007) (92)
The LeChatelier Principle (1996) (91)
Regulating Trade Among Agents (2016) (90)
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (2010) (85)
Introduction to Choice Theory (2004) (85)
Assignment Messages and Exchanges (2009) (84)
Ascending Proxy Auctions (2005) (79)
Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions (2009) (78)
Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium (2009) (74)
Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (1996) (73)
What the Seller Wont Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (2009) (71)
Game theory and the spectrum auctions (1998) (66)
The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Reply (1995) (65)
The economic nature of the firm: Multitask principal–agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design (2009) (64)
Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation (2017) (64)
Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements (2001) (61)
Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions? (1994) (58)
Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (2010) (57)
Advances in Economic Theory: Auction theory (1987) (54)
Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation (2020) (53)
Critical Issues in the Practice of Market Design (2011) (48)
Putting Auction Theory To Work: The Churchill Lectures in Economics (2004) (46)
How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design (2018) (45)
Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising (2015) (42)
Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (2017) (42)
The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (1992) (41)
Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work (1997) (40)
Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand (2005) (35)
The Structure Of Information In Competitive Bidding (1978) (34)
Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions (2007) (33)
The Case for Unlicensed Spectrum (2011) (33)
GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES (1990) (32)
Consumer Theory (2022) (30)
MEASURING THE INTEREST RATE RISK (1985) (28)
IMPLEMENTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS : A GENERALIZATION OF THE BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN THEOREM (2009) (26)
Robust Comparative Statics (2002) (25)
Adverse Selection without Hidden Information (1987) (23)
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (1998) (22)
Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (21)
Presentation and structure of substitutes valuations (2004) (20)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2000) (20)
Designing the US Incentive Auction (2017) (19)
Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal-Form Games (2010) (19)
Statement on Prediction Markets (2007) (19)
Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis (2014) (17)
Package Auctions and Package Exchanges (2005) (15)
IMPLEMENTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS, PART I: A GENERALIZATION OF THE BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN THEOREM (2009) (15)
Optimal Incentives in Core‐Selecting Auctions (2013) (14)
Topologies on Information and Strategies in Games with Incomplete Information (1981) (13)
Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations (2019) (13)
Deferred-Acceptance Heuristic Auctions (2013) (12)
Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses (1997) (12)
Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants (2009) (12)
Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs (2021) (11)
Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions (2006) (10)
Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions (2002) (10)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Uniform Price Auctions (2004) (9)
The Envelope Theorems (1999) (9)
Chapter 1 The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2004) (9)
Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle (2006) (9)
Assessing Economic Outcomes in Simulated Reverse Clock Auctions for Radio Spectrum (2017) (9)
Economists' Statement on U.S. Broadband Policy (2006) (7)
Package Auctions and Package Exchanges: the 2004 Fisher-Schultz Lecture (2006) (7)
Concepts and Properties of Substitute Goods (2006) (7)
Generalized Convex Games (1996) (7)
Equilibrium Limit Pricing Doesn't Limit Entry (1979) (6)
Title Why China's economic reforms differ: the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector (1993) (6)
Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation∗ (2017) (6)
Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: An Experimental Analysis * (2008) (6)
An Essay on Price Discrimination (1989) (5)
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms (2020) (5)
The internal politics of the firm (1998) (5)
Extended Proper Equilibrium (2020) (5)
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions (1997) (4)
Equilibrium Selection in Multi-Player Games with Auction Applications (2014) (4)
Complementarities and systems (1994) (4)
Taming the Communication and Computation Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: The FUEL Bid Language (2022) (3)
Quasirents, Influence and Organization Form (1986) (3)
Substitute Valuations, Auctions, and Equilibrium with Discrete Goods (2006) (3)
Assignment Exchanges (2008) (3)
A Bidding Model of Price Formation Under Uncertainty (1978) (3)
Soft Budget Constraints, Pecuniary Externality, and China’s Financial Dual Track (2000) (2)
Linear Pricing Mechanisms without Convexity (2021) (2)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004) (2)
Dynamics of social, political, and economic institutions (2011) (2)
Investment Incentives in Truthful Approximation Mechanisms (2022) (2)
Organizing Production in a Large Economy (1983) (2)
Producer Theory (2004) (2)
A Practical Combinatorial Auction : The Clock-Proxy Auction (2004) (2)
Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson (2002) (2)
Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study (2020) (2)
Redesigning Spectrum Licenses to Encourage Innovation and Investment (2017) (1)
Interdependence of Types and Values (2004) (1)
Commentary on "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding" (2002) (1)
Organizing Production in a Large Economy with Costly Communication (1983) (1)
Assignment Auctions (2008) (1)
Procuring Universal Telephone Service (1997) (1)
Generalized Deferred Acceptance Auctions with Multiple Relinquishment Options for Spectrum Reallocation (2014) (1)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS (2004) (1)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanisms (2004) (1)
When Should Control Be Shared? (2007) (1)
www.econstor.eu Will Privatization Reduce Costs? (2007) (0)
Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding (2004) (0)
Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity (2022) (0)
The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence (2004) (0)
REDESIGNING SPECTRUM LICENSES “ Depreciating licenses ” would encourage innovation and investment (2017) (0)
Test-Set Equilibrium with Auction Applications ⇤ (2016) (0)
4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes (2017) (0)
American Economic Association Matching with Contracts (2008) (0)
System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances (2012) (0)
Online Appendices for Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms (2012) (0)
Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental (2014) (0)
Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem (2022) (0)
Worst-case mechanism design with undominated strategies (2009) (0)
Comments on Experimental Design for Evaluating Fcc Spectrum Auction Alternatives Major Comment: Test the Clock and Clock-proxy Auction Designs (2005) (0)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Getting to Work (2004) (0)
Chapter 3 Ascending Proxy Auctions (2004) (0)
Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment * (2022) (0)
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF PAY TRANSPARENCY (2021) (0)
This draft: January 8, 2009 Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design Jonathan Levin Stanford University and NBER (2010) (0)
3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution (2017) (0)
Designing markets in the real world (2011) (0)
This draft: December 29, 2009 Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design* Jonathan Levin Stanford University and NBER (2009) (0)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH (2004) (0)
CONTRASTING TWO PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS COMPLEMENTARITY THEORY 1 INTRODUCTION Among the most controversially debated issues by organization theorists are how far-reaching change is possible in the configuration of organizations, and the challenges involved therein (2006) (0)
Substitutes Valuations with Divisible Goods (2006) (0)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences (2004) (0)
1 Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions (2006) (0)
SINCE THE INTRODUCTION in the early 1950's of the Arrow-Debreu theory of general equilibrium under conditions of certainty, a large literature has evolved seeking to extend that theory to accommodate production and trade under (1981) (0)
Desenhando mercados do mundo real (2011) (0)
Foreword by Evan Kwerel (2004) (0)
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Auctions in Context (2004) (0)
Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly (2006) (0)
Report 1 A : Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial (2017) (0)
Chapter 1 DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND THE VOLUME OF TRADE (0)
2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability (2017) (0)
Deterring predation in telecommunications: Are line-of-business restraints needed? (1995) (0)
v-nation, Trade and Corn (1982) (0)
Letter to Fcc Chairman Powell Concerning Auction 35 (2002) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Paul Milgrom?

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Paul Milgrom's Academic­Influence.com Rankings