Peyton Young

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Peyton Young

Peyton Young is affiliated with the following schools: Harvard University, University of Maryland, College Park, CUNY Graduate Center, University of Oxford, University of Michigan, Johns Hopkins University

Peyton Young's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Peyton Young

Economics

#1229

World Rank

#1424

Historical Rank

#564

USA Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Why Is Peyton Young Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Hobart Peyton Young is an American game theorist and economist known for his contributions to evolutionary game theory and its application to the study of institutional and technological change, as well as the theory of learning in games. He is currently centennial professor at the London School of Economics, James Meade Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Oxford, professorial fellow at Nuffield College Oxford, and research principal at the Office of Financial Research at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

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Peyton Young's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

The Evolution of Conventions (1993) (2436)
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions (1999) (1182)
Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics (1990) (1051)
Monotonic solutions of cooperative games (1985) (798)
Equity - in theory and practice (1994) (788)
Condorcet's Theory of Voting (1988) (763)
Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning (2009) (615)
Strategic Learning and Its Limits (2004) (588)
Individual Strategy and Social Structure (2020) (582)
An axiomatization of Borda's rule (1974) (560)
The Economics of Convention (1996) (542)
How Likely Is Contagion in Financial Networks? (2013) (528)
A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle (1978) (493)
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (2015) (441)
Social Choice Scoring Functions (1975) (438)
Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man (1982) (393)
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining (1993) (379)
Social Norms (2021) (316)
Distributive justice in taxation (1988) (302)
On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities (1987) (268)
Cost allocation in water resources development (1982) (248)
The dynamics of social innovation (2011) (232)
Learning by trial and error (2009) (205)
Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games (2009) (204)
Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture (2001) (199)
Cost allocation : methods, principles, applications (1985) (166)
Optimal Voting Rules (1995) (162)
Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium (2003) (149)
Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium Without Knowing You Have an Opponent (2006) (147)
Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice (1990) (147)
Measuring the Compactness of Legislative Districts (1988) (144)
The Evolution of Social Norms (2015) (143)
Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems (2012) (140)
The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks (2000) (140)
Achieving pareto optimality through distributed learning (2012) (137)
Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations (1995) (122)
The Emergence of Classes in a Multi-Agent Bargaining Model (2012) (118)
The Quota Method of Apportionment (1975) (112)
Extending Condorcet's rule (1977) (111)
Payoff based dynamics for multi-player weakly acyclic games (2007) (103)
Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle (1987) (103)
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (2003) (102)
On the impossibility of predicting the behavior of rational agents (2001) (95)
Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks (2014) (94)
Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models (2003) (78)
Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection (2013) (77)
On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games (1996) (65)
Gaming Performance Fees By Portfolio Managers (2010) (59)
Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation (1985) (59)
What is the role of culture in bounded rationality (2001) (59)
Social norms and economic welfare1 (1998) (57)
Learning in a Black Box (2013) (54)
Stability, Coalitions and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems (1978) (51)
Chapter 34 Cost allocation (1994) (51)
A Note on Preference Aggregation (1974) (50)
Cooperation in the long-run (1991) (50)
Group Report: The Cultural and genetic Evolution of Human Cooperation (2003) (48)
The Jefferson Method of Apportionment (1978) (45)
Perspectives on public choice: Group choice and individual judgments (1996) (45)
Negotiation as a Search for Justice (1996) (43)
Diffusion in Social Networks (1999) (41)
Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations (2000) (41)
On Huntington Methods of Apportionment (1977) (39)
The allocation of funds in lobbying and campaigning (1978) (37)
Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations (2006) (35)
Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation (1998) (33)
The Shapley value: Individual contribution and just compensation (1988) (30)
Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2005) (30)
The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning (2007) (29)
Social Dynamics: Theory and Applications (2005) (28)
Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development - A Case Study of Sweden (1980) (26)
A new method for congressional apportionment. (1974) (26)
Chapter 8 - Social Norms (2011) (26)
Self-knowledge and self-deception (2008) (26)
The Spread of Innovations Through Social Learning (2005) (25)
Systemic Importance Indicators for 33 U.S. Bank Holding Companies: An Overview of Recent Data (2015) (25)
The Webster method of apportionment. (1980) (25)
Regret Testing: A Simple Payo-Based Procedure for Learning Nash Equilibrium (2005) (24)
Apportionment Schemes and the Quota Method (1977) (23)
Criteria for Proportional Representation (1979) (23)
Individual learning and social rationality1 (1998) (23)
Dividing the Indivisible (1995) (22)
Decentralized dynamics to optimal and stable states in the assignment game (2013) (21)
Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games (2011) (21)
Contagion in Derivatives Markets (2018) (21)
The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks (2019) (20)
The Spread of Innovations by Social Learning (2006) (18)
Fair Representation in the European Parliament (1982) (17)
Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems (1978) (17)
Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory (2011) (16)
Contagion in the CDS Market (2017) (16)
A Tactical Lobbying Game (1978) (15)
The Hedge Fund Game: Incentives, Excess Returns, and Piggy-Backing (2008) (15)
A Quick Proof of Wagner's Equivalence Theorem (1971) (14)
Quotatone Apportionment Methods (1979) (12)
The limits to compensation in the financial sector (2012) (11)
Handbook of game theory (2015) (10)
Learning with Hazy Beliefs (1998) (10)
Apportioning the United States House of Representatives (1983) (9)
Stochastic Adaptive Dynamics (2005) (9)
Social Coordination and Social Change (1996) (8)
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets (2013) (8)
Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run (2010) (7)
Cost Allocation and Demand Revelation in Public Enterprises (1980) (7)
Collateralized Networks (2019) (6)
The hedge fund game (2008) (6)
On the limits to rational learning (2002) (5)
Hedge Fund Wizards (2008) (5)
Sharing Costs Fairly. A Practical Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory (1981) (5)
Equal Sacrifice in Taxation (1988) (5)
Parliamentary Representation and the Amalgam Method (1981) (5)
How safe are central counterparties in credit default swap markets? (2020) (5)
Acceptance of influence in task groups (1995) (4)
Bound edRationality andLearning On the limits to rational learning (2002) (4)
Chapter 22 Social Dynamics: TheorY AND Applications (2006) (4)
Learning Equilibria in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations (1997) (4)
The Market Value of a Game (1979) (3)
1 The New Social Economics (3)
A Martingale Test for Alpha (2008) (3)
Chapter 15 Apportionment (1994) (2)
The Speed of Innovation Diffusion (2018) (2)
Interpreting von neumann model prices as marginal values (1974) (2)
Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games (1979) (2)
Axiomatizing the Shapley Value without Linearity (1982) (2)
Litigation methods to the burden contract of the contributed acceptance (2012) (2)
A strategy-proof test of portfolio returns (2012) (2)
Learning to Play Nash. (2000) (1)
Correction to ‘Cost allocation in water resources development’ by H. P. Young, N. Okada, and T. Hashimoto (1982) (1)
The Diffusion of a Social Innovation: Executive Stock Options from 1936–2005 (2016) (1)
The Terms of Agricultural Contracts : Theory and Evidence (2000) (1)
The Theory of Apportionment (1980) (1)
Proposals to host the Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society (2005) (1)
Adaptive Learning in Systems of Interacting Agents (2009) (1)
Addendum to “Apportionment Schemes and the Quota Method” (1977) (1)
Contagion in Financial Markets (2015) (1)
Lobbying and Campaigning with Applications to the Measure of Power (1977) (1)
A Problem of Fair Division: Apportioning the European Parliament (1976) (1)
Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium (2006) (1)
2 The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks (1)
Anatomy of the Repo Rate Spikes in September 2019 (2023) (0)
Conditional No-Regret Learning (2004) (0)
Equity (2020) (0)
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series Contagion in Derivatives Markets (2017) (0)
Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, Ken Binmore. Oxford University Press (2007), 639 pp, ISBN: 978-0-19-530057-4 (2007) (0)
APA / Chicago / MLA for the Modern Student: A Practical Guide for Citing Internet and Book Resources (2010) (0)
Working Paper # 0009 June 21 , 2013 How Likely is Contagion in Financial Networks ? (2013) (0)
Fictitious Play and Its Variants (2004) (0)
Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud (2008) (0)
Learning in a Black Box: Trial-and-Error in Voluntary Contribuitons Games (2013) (0)
Why Congress Should Reinstate (2012) (0)
Prediction, Postdiction, and Calibration (2004) (0)
Optimal Group Decisions (1994) (0)
Social Justice and Individual Choice (1994) (0)
Hints on horses : with short notes on camels and pack animals ; also a few practical suggetions on the training of polo ponies an players, and gymkhana training and racing / collected by H.P. Young. (0)
15. Hedge Fund Wizards (2012) (0)
Valuation of Games and Other Discrete Production Processes by Competitive Bidding (1978) (0)
Reinforcement and Regret (2004) (0)
Social norms and economic welfare 1 (1998) (0)
Ken Binmore, Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, Oxford University Press (2007) ISBN 978-0-19-530057-4 639 pp (2007) (0)
C ontagion in Financial Networks (2015) (0)
How safe are central counterparties in credit default swap markets? (2020) (0)
The Interactive Learning Problem (2004) (0)
A Markov Test for Alpha (2011) (0)
Essays on the economics of reputation (2012) (0)
Ken Binmore, , Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory (2007) Oxford University Press 978-0-19-530057-4 639 pp (2007) (0)
N ° 2013 – 10 Learning in a Black Box (2013) (0)
A NewMethodforCongressional Apportionment (1974) (0)

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Other Resources About Peyton Young

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Peyton Young?

Peyton Young is affiliated with the following schools: