Philip J. Reny | Academic Influence

Philip J. Reny's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Philip J. Reny

Economics

#791

World Rank

#940

Historical Rank

Microeconomics

#35

World Rank

#37

Historical Rank

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Economics

Philip J. Reny's Degrees

Bachelors Economics University of California, Berkeley

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Why Is Philip J. Reny Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Philip J. Reny is the Hugo F. Sonnenschein Distinguished Service Professor in Economics and in the college at the University of Chicago. Reny is known as an economic theorist and perhaps is best known for the textbook Advanced microeconomic theory written jointly with Geoffrey A. Jehle. He is a member of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences , and was the Head Editor of Journal of Political Economy. In 1996, Reny became a fellow of the Econometric Society. He has also been a charter member of the Game Theory Society since 1999, and a fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory starting in 2012.

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Philip J. Reny's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games (1999) (690)
Correlated Information and Mechanism Design (1992) (422)
Advanced Microeconomic Theory (2012) (416)
A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core (1994) (201)
Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach (2001) (172)
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games (2009) (165)
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (2004) (164)
AN EFFICIENT AUCTION (2002) (155)
Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria (1992) (152)
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations (2015) (149)
On the failure of the linkage principle in multi-unit auctions (1999) (131)
Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information (1993) (123)
A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers (1993) (121)
Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction (1989) (104)
Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids (2007) (97)
The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization (1995) (97)
An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction (2005) (86)
On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games (1994) (83)
Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees (1997) (77)
How To Count Citations If You Must (2016) (76)
Rationality in Extensive-Form Games (1992) (68)
Matching to share risk (2016) (58)
Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market (1995) (49)
A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma (1999) (47)
Strategic approximations of discontinuous games (2009) (45)
Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (2016) (44)
An ex-post efficient auction (1999) (43)
Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games (1990) (40)
Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views (2004) (38)
Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Existence (2005) (33)
Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems (2017) (33)
A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem (2003) (32)
Further Results on the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games∗ (2009) (32)
A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior (2014) (27)
The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments (1996) (26)
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization (2011) (25)
Introduction to the symposium on discontinuous games (2016) (23)
Knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction: Common knowledge and games with perfect information (1988) (21)
An E¢cient Auction ¤ (2001) (21)
Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions (2011) (20)
An Ex-Post E¢cient Auction¤ (1999) (20)
Tax incidence under imperfect competition: Comment (2012) (17)
Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions (2020) (17)
Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Random Coefficients in Nonlinear Economic Models (2010) (17)
Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information (1988) (16)
The Better Half of Selling Separately (2017) (12)
Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences (2016) (12)
Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants (2009) (12)
The role of excess capacity in determining market power in natural gas transportation markets (2007) (11)
Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games (1995) (8)
An E ¢ cient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction (2001) (8)
A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema (1992) (8)
A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior: Rationalizable Consumer Behavior (2015) (8)
The partnered core of a game with side payments (2012) (7)
Extensive Games and Common Knowledge (1988) (7)
An extension of the KKMS theorem (1998) (7)
On two methods for solving and estimating linear simultaneous equations under rational expectations (1985) (6)
Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths (1997) (6)
A Simple Proof of the Nonconcavifiability of Functions with Linear Not-All-Parallel Contour Sets (2010) (6)
A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem (2021) (6)
Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem (2022) (5)
Tax Incidence Under Imperfect Competition (2011) (5)
BACKWARD INDUCTION, NORMAL FORM PERFECTION (1992) (5)
An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem (2020) (5)
Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core (1997) (4)
On the Rationale for Perfect Equilibrium (1992) (4)
Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games (1995) (4)
E ﬃ cient Matching in the School Choice Problem ∗ (2021) (2)
The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics (2017) (2)
Revenue Maximization in Two Dimensions, or: Two Dimensions of Revenue Maximization (2010) (2)
Assignment Problems (2017) (2)
THE BENEFITS OF MISCOMMUNICATION IN COMMUNICATION GAMES (2013) (2)
Understanding Biparental Sex Through the Absence of Triparental Sex (2011) (2)
A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-Action Games of Perfect Information (1987) (2)
Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof (2002) (2)
A Canonical Game -- Nearly 75 Years in the Making -- Showing the Equivalence of Matrix Games and Linear Programming (2021) (2)
SUPPLEMENT TO “PERFECT CONDITIONAL ε-EQUILIBRIA OF MULTI-STAGE GAMES WITH INFINITE SETS OF SIGNALS AND ACTIONS” (Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 2, March 2020, 495–531) (2017) (2)
The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Volume 1, 720 pp; Volume 2, 672 pp (2003) (1)
No : 08 How To Count Citations If You Must (2016) (1)
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization (2014) (1)
Two papers on the theory of strategic behaviour (1988) (1)
The partnered core of a game with side payments (2012) (1)
Replication data for: How to Count Citations If You Must (2019) (0)
2004 World Congress Special Issue (2008) (0)
Testing theories of sex against the observation that sex is biparental (2007) (0)
A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem (2021) (0)
Tilburg University An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism (2010) (0)
G T ] 2 6 O ct 2 01 8 The Better Half of Selling Separately ∗ (2018) (0)
Corrections and updates for second printing of Osborne and Rubinstein's "A Course in Game Theory" (MIT Press, 1994) (2012) (0)
A Short Proof of Harsanyi's (2003) (0)
Introduction to the symposium on discontinuous games (2016) (0)
Advanced theory of individual economic behaviour in production, consumption, and general equilibrium. Elementary tools of mathematics are employed in the exposition of most topics. (2015) (0)
Why Sex? and Why Only in Pairs?1 (2016) (0)
Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences (2015) (0)
Economics 250a Lecture 1: a Very Quick Overview of Consumer Choice. 1. Review of Basic Consumer Theory 2. Functional Form, Aggregation, and Separability 3. Discrete Choice (2014) (0)
The Deterrent Effect of Cable System Clustering on Overbuilders: An Economic Analysis of Behrend v. Comcast (2015) (0)
Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (2015) (0)
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS (2003) (0)
Corrigendum to “On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games” (2022) (0)
Philip J. Reny on Hugo F. Sonnenschein (2008) (0)
Title Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions (2017) (0)
An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors (1996) (0)

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