Richard McKelvey

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Richard McKelvey

Richard McKelvey is affiliated with the following schools: Washington University in St. Louis, University of California, Berkeley, California Institute of Technology, Oberlin College, University of Rochester

Richard McKelvey's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Richard McKelvey

Political Science

#1370

World Rank

#1647

Historical Rank

#701

USA Rank

political-science Degrees

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Political Science

Richard McKelvey's Degrees

Bachelors Political Science University of California, Berkeley

Why Is Richard McKelvey Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Richard Drummond McKelvey was a political scientist, specializing in mathematical theories of voting. He received his BS in Mathematics from Oberlin College, MA in mathematics from Washington University in St. Louis, and PhD in political science from University of Rochester. He was an Econometric Society fellow, and was the Edie and Lew Wasserman Professor of Political Science at the California Institute of Technology until his death, from cancer, in 2002.

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Richard McKelvey's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level dependent variables (1975) (2541)
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995) (2506)
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control (1976) (1299)
An experimental study of the centipede game (1992) (776)
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games (1998) (731)
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models (1979) (670)
Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory (2006) (516)
Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice (1986) (439)
Computation of equilibria in finite games (1996) (379)
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules (2000) (295)
A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections (1977) (284)
Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources (1985) (256)
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures (1978) (209)
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point (1987) (203)
Self-Correcting Information Cascades (2004) (200)
Seniority in Legislatures (1990) (164)
Public and private information : an experimental study of information pooling (1990) (160)
Structural instability of the core (1986) (158)
Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal (1986) (147)
The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games (1978) (147)
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting (1987) (132)
Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information (1986) (129)
An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games (1996) (124)
A STATISTICAL THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES (1996) (120)
A theory of voting in large elections (2006) (119)
Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists (1987) (119)
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees (1990) (115)
Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models (1984) (112)
Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces (1976) (111)
New perspectives in competitive location theory (1981) (109)
The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria (2000) (108)
Sequential elections with limited information (1985) (101)
The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria (1997) (85)
Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium (1975) (75)
An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior (1984) (69)
Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences (1989) (64)
Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria (1976) (59)
Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model (1984) (58)
An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game (1976) (55)
Vote trading: An experimental study (1980) (49)
A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games (1993) (46)
An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games (2006) (43)
Retrospective voting: An experimental study (1987) (41)
Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model (1987) (35)
Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem (2002) (35)
Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions (1980) (33)
A Liapunov Function for Nash Equilibria (1998) (33)
A ham sandwich theorem for general measures (1984) (30)
An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem (2000) (30)
Ambiguity in spatial models of policy formation (1980) (30)
Convergent Synthesis of Betaine-30, a Solvatochromic Dye: An Advanced Undergraduate Project and Demonstration (1996) (26)
Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions (1982) (24)
Voting over Economic Plans (1995) (21)
Taking the Coase Theorem Seriously (1999) (19)
Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (1996) (18)
Two-Candidate Elections without Majority Rule Equilibria (1982) (17)
Some experimental results that fail to support the competitive solution (1983) (16)
An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions (2000) (16)
An Experimental Test of Several Theories of Committee Decision Making Under Majority Rule (1979) (13)
A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design (1981) (13)
Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games (1979) (12)
Learning in experimental games (1994) (12)
Cycles of risk (1974) (12)
The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information (1995) (10)
Initial Versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority (1991) (10)
Games and Economic Behavior (1995) (10)
Asynchronicity and Learning in Cost Sharing Mechanisms I Am Indebted to Scott Shenker for His Many Helpful Comments and Suggestions. I Thank (1997) (9)
Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game (1997) (9)
Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk (2010) (7)
Game theory and the french apparentements of 1951 (1979) (7)
Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces (1990) (5)
An Experimental Test of Solution Theories for Cooperative Games in Normal Form (1982) (5)
Methods for Comparison of Markov Processes by Stochastic Dominance (1981) (3)
The relationship between the generalized median and minimax sets: A correction (1984) (3)
The hard sciences. (1999) (3)
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem (1983) (3)
Chapter 60 Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis (2008) (3)
Constructing Majority Paths Between Arbitrary Points: General Methods of Solution for Quasi-Concave Preferences (1983) (3)
FORMAL VOTING MODELS (1979) (1)
Sequential Elections with Limited Information A Formal Analysis (2007) (1)
Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information (1992) (1)
Computational Issues in the Statistical Design and Analysis of Experimental Games (1993) (1)
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (2006) (0)
PSR volume 71 issue 1 Cover and Front matter (1977) (0)
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game Author ( s ) : (1992) (0)
American Economic Association Voting over Economic Plans (2008) (0)
Common Knowledge and Consensus with Aggregate Statistics (1984) (0)
Advanced Problems: 5952,5994-5999 (1974) (0)
Dr. Jeffrey Scot Banks (2001) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Richard McKelvey?

Richard McKelvey is affiliated with the following schools:

Richard McKelvey's Academic­Influence.com Rankings