Roger Myerson
American economist
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Economics
Why Is Roger Myerson Influential?
(Suggest an Edit or Addition)According to Wikipedia, Roger Bruce Myerson is an American economist and professor at the University of Chicago. He holds the title of the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts in the Harris School of Public Policy, the Griffin Department of Economics, and the college. Previously, he held the title The Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics. In 2007, he was the winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin for "having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory." He was elected a Member of the American Philosophical Society in 2019.
Roger Myerson's Published Works
Published Works
- Optimal Auction Design (1981) (5882)
- Game theory - Analysis of Conflict (1991) (4203)
- Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading (1983) (2520)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979) (2071)
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982) (1855)
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games (1977) (1478)
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982) (975)
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983) (736)
- MULTISTAGE GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION (1984) (640)
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules (1978) (609)
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983) (504)
- A Theory of Voting Equilibria (1993) (476)
- Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems (1993) (472)
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (1978) (395)
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998) (392)
- Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value (1998) (338)
- Large Poisson Games (2000) (334)
- Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (1993) (313)
- Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory (1999) (293)
- The Shapley value: Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: an application of the Shapley value (1988) (283)
- The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State (2008) (261)
- Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures (1999) (261)
- Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (1998) (224)
- Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (1982) (216)
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria (1986) (206)
- Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems (1981) (200)
- An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories (1993) (192)
- Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games (2002) (184)
- Values of games in partition function form (1977) (168)
- Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems (1998) (160)
- Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction (1983) (149)
- Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy (2006) (148)
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections (1996) (127)
- Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory (2008) (115)
- Monotonicity and independence axioms (1980) (112)
- Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria (2004) (103)
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption (1993) (101)
- Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance (1995) (98)
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans (1989) (92)
- Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility (1977) (91)
- Viscous Population Equilibria (1991) (84)
- Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (1983) (83)
- Population uncertainty in contests (2006) (80)
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria (1986) (73)
- Learning from Schelling s Strategy of Conflict (2009) (68)
- Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information (2004) (64)
- A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles (2012) (62)
- Dual Reduction and Elementary Games (1997) (58)
- Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz (2009) (55)
- Cooperative games with incomplete information (2005) (54)
- Cooperative games with imcomplete information (1984) (53)
- Probability Models for Economic Decisions (2004) (51)
- Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility (1994) (51)
- On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science (1992) (50)
- Economic Effects of Constitutions (2005) (48)
- Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory (2013) (46)
- Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I-III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information" (2004) (41)
- Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan (2014) (40)
- Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy (2015) (40)
- An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections (1991) (39)
- Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's The Bankers' New Clothes (2014) (37)
- Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication (2005) (29)
- Toward a theory of leadership and state building (2011) (29)
- Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections (1998) (29)
- Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria (2015) (28)
- The Role of Oligarchic Property Rightsa Macroeconomic Model of Russian Transition (2007) (28)
- An axiomatic derivation of subjective probability, utility, and evaluation functions (1979) (27)
- Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights (2007) (25)
- Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory (1986) (23)
- Rethinking the Fundamentals of State-building (2011) (22)
- Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster (2004) (21)
- Breaking the Countercyclical Pattern of Local Democracy in Pakistan (2015) (21)
- Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection (1995) (20)
- Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections (2012) (18)
- Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions (2020) (17)
- Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games (1978) (16)
- A Macroeconomic Model of Russian Transition: The Role of Oligarchic Property Rights (2007) (16)
- Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption (2006) (16)
- Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview (1985) (14)
- Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization (1995) (14)
- Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems (1980) (13)
- Commentary: A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq (2009) (13)
- Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective (2007) (13)
- Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory (1992) (13)
- How to Prepare for State-Building (2017) (12)
- Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games (1997) (12)
- An Introduction to Game Theory (1984) (12)
- Incentive Constraints and Optimal Communication Systems (1988) (12)
- Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi (2001) (10)
- Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction (1996) (10)
- Democratic Decentralization and Economic Development (2015) (9)
- John Nash's Contribution to Economics (1996) (8)
- Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents (2014) (8)
- Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters (1992) (8)
- On the Not so Obvious Relation between Risk and Incentives in Principal-Agent Relations (2002) (7)
- Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations (2006) (7)
- Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions (1978) (7)
- Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons (1997) (7)
- Capitalist investment and political liberalization (2010) (7)
- Local agency costs of political centralization (2021) (6)
- Multistage Games with (2007) (6)
- Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment (2005) (6)
- Economic Analysis of Constitutions (2000) (5)
- Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters (1999) (5)
- A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization (2009) (4)
- Values of Games Without Sidepayments (1977) (4)
- Game-Theoretic Models of Politics (1993) (4)
- Standards for State-Building Interventions (2014) (3)
- An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability (1978) (3)
- The Strength of American Federal Democracy (2015) (2)
- SUPPLEMENT TO “PERFECT CONDITIONAL ε-EQUILIBRIA OF MULTI-STAGE GAMES WITH INFINITE SETS OF SIGNALS AND ACTIONS” (Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 2, March 2020, 495–531) (2017) (2)
- Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure (1994) (2)
- A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations (1983) (2)
- The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics (2017) (2)
- Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (1980) (2)
- Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers (2017) (1)
- Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (2008) (1)
- Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections (2011) (1)
- Game Theory.@@@Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. (1993) (1)
- Local Foundations for Better Governance: A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's Localizing Development (2014) (1)
- Settled equilibria (2012) (1)
- Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory (1990) (1)
- Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model (1978) (1)
- Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion (1978) (1)
- An algorithm for computing equilibria in a linear monetary economy (1981) (1)
- An Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem (1976) (1)
- An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium (1995) (1)
- The Strength of American Federal Democracy: Lessons for Global Development (2015) (1)
- Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory Proof. Suppose That F Is a Monotone Social Choice Function. Let X Denote the Range of F (2011) (1)
- Emerson in His Own Time (2003) (1)
- Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson (2007) (1)
- Pay for Percentile, Working Paper 2009-09 (2009) (1)
- Local and National Democracy in Political Reconstruction (2016) (1)
- 2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS (2000) (0)
- DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS (2003) (0)
- Dynamic Matching Problems With Incentive Constraints (1987) (0)
- Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption (2005) (0)
- Exposita Notes Population uncertainty in contests (2006) (0)
- Reforming local government in Pakistan (2014) (0)
- ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY* (2022) (0)
- Optimal Auction Design Author ( s ) : (2007) (0)
- Lugard's principles of colonial administration (2022) (0)
- how a revolutionary vanguard might use violence to mobilize a mass public. The mechanism is informational - the vanguard uses violence to manipulate population member's beliefs about the (2010) (0)
- OLIGARCHIC PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA (2006) (0)
- ffi cient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information " , by Bengt Holmström and Roger B (2015) (0)
- Dynamic Approach to Game and Economic Theory (2015) (0)
- A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information (1980) (0)
- 1 CAPITAL AND GROWTH WITH OLIGARCHIC PROPERTY RIGHTS (2005) (0)
- E ffi cient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information " , by Bengt Holmström and (2016) (0)
- t he t heory of m echanism Design: an overview (2007) (0)
- Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Inequality and Social Discounting Inequality and Social Discounting* (2011) (0)
- Information Aggregation and Equilibrium Selection in Committees (2007) (0)
- Optimal Banking Union Design This Chapter Is Based on Zoican and Górnicka (2014). Apart from the Collaboration with Lucyna Górnicka, the Research Greatly Benefited from Discussion with 2.1 Introduction (2015) (0)
- Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions (2021) (0)
- Leadership and Society (2021) (0)
- Local Politics and Democratic State-Building (2022) (0)
- Pay for Percentile; (2009) (0)
- Linking the best and worst of global trends (2017) (0)
- Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics (1977) (0)
- The Free‐Market Economy Is Fundametally Healthy (2009) (0)
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