Stephen Morris

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Stephen Morris

Stephen Morris is affiliated with the following schools: Yale University, University of Oxford, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, University of Cambridge

Stephen Morris 's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Stephen Morris

Economics

#2757

World Rank

#3137

Historical Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Why Is Stephen Morris Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Stephen Edward Morris is an economic theorist and game theorist especially known for his research in the field of global games. Since July 2019, he has been a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Prior to that he taught at Princeton, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania. He was the editor of Econometrica for the period 2007–2011, and in 2019 served as president of the Econometric Society.

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Stephen Morris 's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Social Value of Public Information (2002) (1985)
Global Games: Theory and Applications (2001) (1183)
Robust Mechanism Design (2003) (643)
Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks" American Economic Review (1996) (626)
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests (1995) (595)
Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt (2002) (568)
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory (1995) (542)
Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling (2000) (418)
Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning (1996) (409)
Liquidity Black Holes (2003) (399)
Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (1993) (399)
Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (2001) (382)
Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2017) (368)
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2013) (333)
The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information (1997) (322)
Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders (2001) (310)
The Limits of Price Discrimination (2013) (293)
Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (2006) (279)
TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIOR BELIEFS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (1994) (278)
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (2011) (248)
Communication and Monetary Policy (2002) (241)
P-dominance and belief potential (2010) (225)
Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work? (2003) (206)
Financial Regulation in a System Context (2009) (198)
Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices (2006) (187)
Policy Persistence (2000) (185)
Interim Correlated Rationalizability (2007) (183)
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2002) (170)
Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (2003) (133)
OPTIMAL COMMUNICATION (2005) (130)
Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk (2016) (130)
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (2016) (124)
Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (2009) (120)
Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk (2002) (118)
Topologies on Types (2005) (117)
Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (2003) (113)
Risk management with interdependent choice (1999) (113)
Redemption Risk and Cash Hoarding by Asset Managers (2017) (107)
First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2015) (105)
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS (2001) (104)
Contagious Adverse Selection (2010) (96)
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (2003) (93)
Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2003) (91)
A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks (1998) (89)
Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (1997) (89)
Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (2003) (73)
Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (2008) (72)
Best Response Equivalence (2002) (72)
Ex Post Implementation (2005) (71)
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004) (62)
Information and Volatility (2014) (62)
The Logic of Belief and Belief Change: A Decision Theoretic Approach (1996) (59)
Inertia of Forward-Looking Expectations (2006) (59)
Robust Virtual Implementation (2009) (57)
PAYOFF CONTINUITY IN INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES (1998) (56)
Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (2015) (55)
Rationalizable Implementation (2009) (54)
Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty (1995) (52)
The Wald Problem and the Equivalence of Sequential Sampling and Static Information Costs (2017) (51)
Political Correctness (2001) (51)
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty (2002) (51)
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2004) (51)
Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching Games (1997) (50)
Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design (2016) (49)
Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: A Global Game Approach (2014) (48)
The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs (1997) (44)
Risk, uncertainty and hidden information (1997) (44)
A foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory (2013) (42)
Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005) (41)
Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game (2002) (40)
Correction to: Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey (1997) (38)
The Wald Problem and the Relation of Sequential Sampling and Ex-Ante Information Costs (2019) (37)
Finance Applications of Game Theory (1998) (34)
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (2007) (34)
An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design (2013) (31)
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (2011) (31)
Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices (2018) (30)
Robust Mechanism Design: The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs (2012) (30)
Approximate common knowledge revisited (1999) (27)
Commonp-Belief: The General Case (1997) (26)
Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game (2001) (26)
Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks (2019) (25)
Information and Market Power (2015) (24)
An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (2007) (24)
Expectations, Networks, and Conventions (2017) (24)
Informational events which trigger currency attacks (1995) (23)
Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice (2016) (23)
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence (2018) (23)
Alternative Definitions of Knowledge (1997) (23)
Inflation dynamics and the parallel market for foreign exchange (1995) (22)
The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency (2013) (22)
Coordinating Expectations in Monetary Policy (2007) (22)
The Robustness of Robust Implementation (2010) (20)
Co-Operation and Timing (1995) (20)
The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (2007) (19)
Higher-Order Expectations (2017) (19)
Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach (2015) (19)
Fiscal stabilization and exchange rate instability (1988) (19)
An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness (1998) (19)
Laws and Authority (2016) (19)
Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998) (18)
Coordination , timing and common knowledge $ (2014) (18)
Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms (2006) (18)
Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (2016) (18)
Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games (2020) (16)
Inspiring Regime Change (2018) (16)
Interim Rationalizability (2005) (15)
Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States (2016) (15)
Policy Conditionality (1996) (15)
Welfare Effects of Public Information (2000) (14)
Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination (2006) (14)
The Cnbc Effect: Welfare Effects of Public Information (2001) (14)
OPTIMAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN AUCTIONS (2018) (14)
Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness (2016) (13)
Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation (2007) (13)
Justifying Rational Expectations (1995) (13)
Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (2012) (12)
Game Theory Models in Finance (2014) (12)
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (2012) (12)
Market Risk with Interdependent Choice (2000) (12)
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (2010) (11)
Counterfactuals with Latent Information (2019) (11)
Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2011) (11)
Search, Information, and Prices (2020) (11)
Rationalizable Trade (2000) (11)
Coordination and Continuous Choice (2016) (10)
Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model (2017) (10)
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information March 31 , 2013 (2013) (9)
Information, Market Power and Price Volatility (2019) (9)
Notes on Strategic Substitutes and Complements in Global Games (2005) (9)
Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty (1998) (9)
Statistical Discrimination and E ciency (1999) (9)
Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability (2012) (9)
Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction (2013) (8)
Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts (2014) (8)
Reward and Punishment in a Regime Change Game (2017) (8)
the Comparison of Information Structures (2013) (7)
Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information and Local Interaction (1998) (6)
InformatIon DesIgn anD BayesIan PersuasIon ‡ Information Design , Bayesian Persuasion , and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium † By Dirk Bergemann (2016) (6)
Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs (2011) (6)
Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from? (2013) (5)
No Trade and Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs∗ (2020) (5)
CARESS Working Paper # 97-02 Interaction Games : A Uni ̄ ed Analysis of Incomplete Information , Local Interaction and Random Matching ¤ (1997) (5)
CARESS Working Paper #97-01 Contagion ¤ (1997) (4)
Revising Knowledge: a Hierarchical Approach (1994) (4)
Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs” (2019) (4)
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks Working paper (2009) (4)
Information and Interaction (2017) (4)
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory (2012) (4)
The rationality and efficacy of decisions under uncertainty and the value of an experiment (1997) (4)
Regime Change Global Games with Heterogeneous Players and Continuous Actions (2005) (4)
On the Dynamic Selection of Mechanisms for Provision of Public Projects (1995) (3)
Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey (1997) (3)
Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey (2020) (3)
InformatIon DesIgn anD BayesIan PersuasIon (2016) (3)
Contagious Adverse Selection - Revised November, 2010 (2010) (3)
Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited (2011) (3)
Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation (2008) (3)
Re nements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Uni ed Survey (2018) (3)
Information Design: A Unied Perspective (2017) (3)
Alternative Notions of Knowledge (1994) (3)
Screening with Persuasion (2022) (3)
Information and Market Power in Rational Expectations Equilibrium (2014) (2)
Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (2007) (2)
Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition∗ (2021) (2)
Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions (2022) (2)
Games with Incomplete Information (2011) (2)
CARESS WorkingPaper#95-03 The Revelationof Information and Self-Fullling Beliefs ¤ (1995) (2)
Theoretical Approach and Some Policy Conclusions Using Mexican Data (2001) (2)
ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION IN DIRECT MECHANISMS BY DIRK BERGEMANN (2009) (2)
Paradoxes of common knowledge revisited: a perspective from game theory and economics (1996) (1)
Competition and Public Information: A Note (2020) (1)
Common Belief Foundations of Global Games November 2015 (2015) (1)
Communication and Monetary Policy Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics Communication and Monetary Policy * (2002) (1)
Incomplete Information Robustness (2020) (1)
On the Joint Design of Information and Transfers (2022) (1)
First-price auctions with general information structures: a short introduction (2018) (1)
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No . 1421 R April 2004 ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN (2004) (1)
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version (2007) (1)
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability Dirk Bergemann (2009) (1)
A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (2009) (0)
Trade and Almost Common Knowledge (1993) (0)
Firm Certification∗ (2020) (0)
Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey (2019) (0)
American Economic Association Social Value of Public (2007) (0)
Counterfactuals with Latent Information ∗ Dirk Bergemann † (2019) (0)
Chapter 2 Game Theory Models in Finance (2019) (0)
CARESS Working Paper # 95-04 Justifying Rational Expectations (2000) (0)
Correction to: Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey (2020) (0)
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing (2023) (0)
Notes and References for Foz Do Iguaçu Talk (2009) (0)
Developments in Dynamic mechanism Design † An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values : Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty By Dirk Bergemann and (2007) (0)
American Economic Association Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks Author ( s ) : (2007) (0)
Coordination and Continuous Choice December 2016 (2017) (0)
Robustness and appRoximation in mechanism design ‡ Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (2012) (0)
Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work? Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics (2003) (0)
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No . 1846 EFFICIENT AUCTIONS AND INTERDEPENDENT TYPES (2012) (0)
ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION IN GENERAL MECHANISMS BY Dirk Bergemann (2011) (0)
CARESS Working Paper # 95-19 Policy Persistence (2000) (0)
CARESS Working Paper # 9513 Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning ¤ (2000) (0)
Global Game Selections in Binary-Action Supermodular Games (2023) (0)
Completion of the Proof of Proposition 4 in "Interim Correlated Rationalizability" (2007) (0)
No . 1007 “ Notes on “ Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs ” ” (2019) (0)
Speed vs Resilience in Contagion (2022) (0)
M EASURING S TRATEGIC U NCERTAINTY IN C OORDINATION G AMES (2004) (0)
AN INTRODUCTION TO ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN By Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris COWLES (2013) (0)
Random ambiguity (2021) (0)
Tilburg University Convergence of Beliefs in Bayesian Network Games (2007) (0)
Correction to: Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs” (2020) (0)
ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION : THE CASE OF DIRECT MECHANISMS By Dirk Bergemann (2007) (0)
CARESS WorkingPaper#95-04 JustifyingRational Expectations (1995) (0)
on “ Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs ” Atsushi Kajii (2019) (0)
EX POST IMPLEMENTATION BY DIRK BERGEMANN and STEPHEN MORRIS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1226 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS (2008) (0)
E ¢ cient Auctions and Interdependent Types Dirk Bergemann (2012) (0)
Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge (2014) (0)
Financial Institutions Center Finance Applications of Game Theory (1998) (0)
Dynamic Auctions: Uniqueness and Robustness to Private Information (2007) (0)
Price Bubbles and Learning (1993) (0)
Efficient Location Choice and the Returns to Agglomeration∗ (2017) (0)
Screening with Persuasion (cid:3) (2022) (0)
www.econstor.eu Topologies on Types (2006) (0)
The Limits of Price Discrimination April 14 , 2014 (2014) (0)
Coordination without Common Knowledge (2006) (0)
1 FINANCE APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY (0)
Information in the first price auction ∗ (2015) (0)
STEPHEN MORRIS RISK , UNCERTAINTY AND HIDDEN INFORMATION (1997) (0)
Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs” (2019) (0)
Political Correctness Stephen Morris (2001) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Stephen Morris ?

Stephen Morris is affiliated with the following schools: