Steven C. Salop

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Steven C. Salop

Steven C. Salop is affiliated with the following schools: Georgetown University, University of Pennsylvania, Harvard University

Steven C. Salop's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Steven C. Salop

Economics

#1370

World Rank

#1584

Historical Rank

Microeconomics

#39

World Rank

#41

Historical Rank

economics Degrees

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Economics

Why Is Steven C. Salop Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Steven C. Salop is an American economist and academic whose work focuses on antitrust policy. He is a professor of economics and law at the Georgetown University Law Center. Salop is known for his scholarship on exclusionary practices and vertical mergers. Together with David Scheffman, he popularized the concept of raising rivals' costs as an antitrust violation.

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Steven C. Salop's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Monopolistic competition with outside goods (1979) (3143)
Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion (1977) (1138)
A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment (1979) (738)
Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market (1976) (641)
COMPETITION AND INTEGRATION AMONG COMPLEMENTS, AND NETWORK MARKET STRUCTURE* (1992) (465)
Equilibrium with Product Differentiation (1984) (454)
Cost-Raising Strategies (1987) (413)
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure (2010) (379)
The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents (1982) (362)
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price (1986) (352)
The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and Price Discrimination (1977) (336)
Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control (2000) (312)
Strategic Entry Deterrence (1979) (297)
Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition (1983) (262)
The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information (1981) (243)
Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures (1986) (230)
Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination (1986) (220)
Consumer Search and Public Policy (1981) (152)
Systematic job search and unemployment (1973) (139)
Information and Monopolistic Competition (1976) (105)
Wage differentials in a dynamic theory of the firm (1973) (95)
Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story (2003) (86)
A Framework for Evaluating Consumer Information Regulation (1981) (84)
Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary Rights (1986) (72)
Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality (2015) (70)
Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard (2005) (59)
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply (1992) (59)
Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules (1998) (58)
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard (2005) (53)
WHEN BACKWARD INTEGRATION BY A DOMINANT FIRM IMPROVES WELFARE (2002) (51)
Information Remedies for Consumer Protection (1981) (50)
Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust (1987) (50)
vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers (2012) (44)
Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement (2018) (38)
Updating the Merger Guidelines: Comments (2009) (36)
Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers (2004) (36)
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law (2008) (36)
Deregulating Self-Regulated Shared Atm Networks (1990) (32)
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft (1998) (29)
You Keep On Knocking But You Can't Come In: Evaluating Restrictions On Access To Input Joint Ventures (1995) (27)
Exclusionary Vertical Restraints Law: Has Economics Mattered? (1993) (24)
Policy Watch: Antitrust Goes to College (1991) (23)
Firm-Specific Information, Product Differentiation, and Industry Equilibrium (1985) (22)
The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium (1999) (22)
Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners (2015) (18)
The Raising Rivals’ Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices and the Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test (2016) (18)
Strategy, predation, and antitrust analysis (1983) (17)
The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case (2000) (17)
Defects in Disneyland: Quality Control as a Two-Part Tariff (1983) (17)
Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test with Multi-Product Firms (2008) (16)
Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy (2019) (15)
DEFINING EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT: SECTION 2, THE RULE OF REASON, AND THE UNIF Y ING PRINCIPLE UNDERLY ING ANTITRUST RULES (2006) (14)
A NOTE ON VERTICAL MERGERS WITH AN UPSTREAM MONOPOLIST: FORECLOSURE AND CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECTS (2015) (12)
A Model of Ordered Bargaining with Applications (2008) (12)
An Economic Analysis of the AT&T-T-Mobile USA Wireless Merger (2012) (11)
Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct (2020) (11)
Selling Consumer Information (1980) (11)
Gauging Parallel Accommodating Conduct Concerns with the CPPI (2011) (10)
Joint Response to the House Judiciary Committee on the State of Antitrust Law and Implications for Protecting Competition in Digital Markets (2020) (9)
The Competitive Effects of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply (2001) (9)
Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark (2008) (9)
Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare (2012) (9)
The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach (2015) (9)
Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners (2014) (8)
The AT&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash (2018) (8)
Monopolistic competition reconstituted; or, circular fashions in economic thought (1977) (8)
Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multi-Judge Panels (1992) (8)
Second-Best Policies in Imperfect Competition: How Improved Information may Lower Welfare (1978) (7)
Measuring Ease of Entry (1986) (7)
Vertical Mergers and Monopoly Leverage (1998) (7)
Issues and Outcomes, Guidance and Indeterminacy: A reply to Professor John Rogers and Others (1996) (7)
PREDATORY PRICING AFTER BROOKE GROUP: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2016) (7)
Information, Welfare, and Product Diversity (1987) (6)
Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers: Response (1987) (6)
Modifying Merger Consent Decrees: An Economist Plot to Improve Merger Enforcement Policy (2016) (6)
An Administrable and Efficient Legal Standard for Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist (2009) (5)
Whither Antitrust Enforcement in the Trump Administration? (2017) (5)
TREBLE DAMAGES REFORM: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GEORGETOWN PROJECT (2016) (5)
Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis (1996) (4)
cGUPPI: Scoring Incentives to Engage in Parallel Accommodating Conduct (2015) (4)
Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the Task? (2021) (4)
When Vertical is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead to Increases in “Effective Concentration” (2020) (4)
vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers (Appendix) (2013) (4)
Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994-April 2020 (2015) (3)
Analyzing Vertical Mergers to Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies (2019) (3)
Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers and Public Policy (1988) (3)
United States v AT&T/Time Warner (2018) (3)
Recommendations and Comments on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines (2020) (3)
An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards (2017) (3)
The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here? (2021) (3)
Modifying Merger Consent Decrees to Improve Merger Enforcement Policy (2016) (3)
The Appropriate Legal Standard and Sufficient Economic Evidence for Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The FTC's McWane Case (2014) (2)
Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation (2020) (2)
Market Definition in Merger Analysis (2017) (2)
A Few Righteous Men: Imperfect Information, Quit-for-Tat, and Critical Mass in the Dynamics of Cooperation (2002) (2)
Analysis of Foreclosure in the EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2001) (2)
A framework for analyzing monopolistically competitive price dispersion (1977) (2)
Quantifying the Increase in 'Effective Concentration' from Vertical Mergers that Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines (2020) (2)
Using Leverage to Preserve Monopoly: Discussion of Katz and Shapiro Paper (1998) (1)
NEW ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION (2016) (1)
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: A Suggested Revision (2020) (1)
Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Economists’ Comment (2010) (1)
Using Leverage to Preserve Monopoly (1999) (1)
EVALUATING VERTICAL MERGERS: REPLY TO REIFFEN AND VITA COMMENT (2016) (1)
Vertical Mergers in a Model of Upstream Monopoly and Incomplete Information (2021) (1)
Rational expectations and multiple equilibria: love, faith, money and underemployment (1978) (1)
Updating the Merger Guidelines: Hearings Statement December 3, 2009 (2010) (1)
What consensus? Why ideology and elections still matter to antitrust (2014) (1)
A Suggested Revision of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (July 7, 2021) (2021) (1)
Rebuilding Platform Antitrust: Moving on from Ohio v. American Express (2021) (1)
The Kodak Case, the First Principles Approach, and Antitrust at the Millennium (1999) (1)
The Protected Profits Benchmark: Responses to Comments (2013) (1)
The US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission release new Horizontal Merger Guidelines which include what amounts to a "gross upward pricing pressure index" (GUPPI) (2010) (1)
The natural rate of unemployment and the reserve army of the unemployed (1977) (0)
Amicus Brief of Law and Economics Scholars Supporting the Federal Trade Commission in FTC v Qualcomm (2019) (0)
Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Economics Scholars in Support of Appellee and Affirmance (2019) (0)
:·1ULT I-MARKET STRATEGI'ES IN A DOMI NANT FIRM INDUST RY (1984) (0)
DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Price Discrimination (2017) (0)
Potential Competition and Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits (2021) (0)
Takeovers and Public Policy (2007) (0)
A Suggested Revision of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (Version: April 30, 2022) (2022) (0)
FIRM-SPECIFIC INFORHATION, PROruCf DIFFERENf~ATION, AND INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM* (2008) (0)
POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 2 IN DEREGULATED INDUSTRIES OR SECTION 2 WITHOUT FEAR (2016) (0)
2020 Antitrust Writing Awards (2019) (0)
EQUILIBRlillol WITIi PRODUCr DIFFEREi'HIATION (2008) (0)
Version : 31 December 2021 ) (2022) (0)
The First Principles Approach to Antitrust , Kodak , and Antitrust at the Millenium * 68 Antitrust L . J . 187-202 ( 2000 ) (2013) (0)
!lwwilfe.il ^^ ,rtlm2 Working Paper Alfred P. Sloan School of Management Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure Have Benefitted from Several Useful Discussions with Mike Whinston and Comments from Louis Kaplow, Jean Tirole, and Other Participants at a Conference on Vertical Restraints (2008) (0)
Proposed Improvements in Merger Enforcement and Guidelines (2022) (0)
COMMENTS ON PRESENTATION OF STEVEN C. SALOP (2016) (0)
Equilibrium Models of Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly Experiments with Price-setting Firms Equilibrium Models of Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly Experiments with Price-setting Firms* (2009) (0)
The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here? (2021) (0)
Fixing "Litigating the Fix" (2022) (0)
Understanding Richard Posner on Exclusionary Conduct (2018) (0)
Litigation with Inalienable Judgments (2022) (0)
Antitrust Worker Protections: Rejecting Multi-Market Balancing as a Justification for Anticompetitive Harms to Workers (2022) (0)
Evaluating Joint Ventures: Economic Analysis Checklist (2016) (0)
A practical guide to merger analysis (1984) (0)
Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines (FTC Hearings) (2018) (0)
Exploring Exploitative Pricing: Combating Exploitation with Counterparty Coordination (2023) (0)
The Reasonable Competitive Conduct Standard for Antitrust (2023) (0)
The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millenium (2019) (0)
Merger Enforcement Statistics: 2001-2020 (2022) (0)
What Consensus? Ideology, Politics and Elections Still Matter (2013) (0)
APPENDIX A ANALYZING ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION (2016) (0)
Sample Guidelines on Exclusionary Access Agreements by Competitor Collaborations (1999) (0)
Ricardian Equilibrium with Stochastic Free Entry (2001) (0)
Guiding Section 5: Comments on the Commissioners (2013) (0)
Strategic Incentives in Non-Coasean Litigation (2021) (0)
Incentive Scoring in Merger Review (2013) (0)
What is Trump Antitrust ? Competition Policy Under a New U.S. Administration (2017) (0)
Legitimate Theories : Raising Rivals ' Costs by Foreclosing Supply 234 a . Bottleneck (2018) (0)
An Antitrust Exemption for Workers: And Why Worker Bargaining Power Benefits Consumers, Too (2023) (0)
A 'Probability of a Probability': Understanding the Section 7 Reasonable Probability Standard (2023) (0)
THE GEORGETOWN STUDY OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (2016) (0)

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Steven C. Salop?

Steven C. Salop is affiliated with the following schools: