Leonid Hurwicz

Q: What Schools Are Affiliated With Leonid Hurwicz

Leonid Hurwicz is affiliated with the following schools: Harvard University, London School of Economics, University of Minnesota, Illinois Institute of Technology, University of Chicago, University of Warsaw

Leonid Hurwicz's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Leonid Hurwicz

Economics

#34

World Rank

#56

Historical Rank

#26

USA Rank

Social Choice Theory

World Rank

Historical Rank

USA Rank

economics Degrees

Leonid Hurwicz

Mathematics

#142

World Rank

#341

Historical Rank

#62

USA Rank

Game Theory

World Rank

Historical Rank

USA Rank

Measure Theory

#218

World Rank

#337

Historical Rank

#98

USA Rank

mathematics Degrees

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Economics
Mathematics

Why Is Leonid Hurwicz Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Leonid Hurwicz was a Polish–American economist and mathematician, known for his work in game theory and mechanism design. He originated the concept of incentive compatibility, and showed how desired outcomes can be achieved by using incentive compatible mechanism design. Hurwicz shared the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his seminal work on mechanism design. Hurwicz was one of the oldest Nobel Laureates, having received the prize at the age of 90.

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Leonid Hurwicz's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Measuring Business Cycles. (1946) (2676)
Studies in Linear and Non-Linear Programming. (1959) (1067)
On informationally decentralized systems (1977) (883)
The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation (1973) (614)
ON THE STABILITY OF THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM, I1 (1958) (547)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes (1977) (400)
Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points (1979) (317)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Appendix: An optimality criterion for decision-making under ignorance (1977) (284)
Preferences, Utility, and Demand. (1972) (227)
Constraint Qualifications in Maximization Problems (1961) (144)
On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria (1979) (142)
On the Structural Form of Interdependent Systems (1966) (133)
On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies (1990) (128)
Designing Economic Mechanisms (2006) (124)
But Who Will Guard the Guardians (2007) (120)
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets (1995) (119)
Social goals and social organization : essays in memory of Elisha Pazner (1985) (116)
Technological change and economic theory (1972) (111)
Social Goals and Social Organization (1986) (106)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. (1979) (98)
Institutions As Families Of Game Forms (1996) (97)
Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions (1994) (86)
Incentive Structures Maximizing Residual Gain Under Incomplete Information (1978) (85)
Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria (1978) (84)
A STOCHASTIC DECENTRALIZED RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS: PART I (1975) (80)
Stability of the Gradient Process in n-Person Games (1960) (58)
COMPETITIVE STABILITY UNDER WEAK GROSS SUBSTITUTABILITY: THE EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE APPROACH (1960) (54)
On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization (1969) (51)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: The design of resource allocation mechanisms (1977) (50)
Programming in Linear Spaces (2014) (44)
What is the Coase Theorem (1995) (43)
SOME REMARKS ON THE EQUILIBRIA OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1960) (37)
Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise (1999) (37)
Social choice and public decision making: On the implementation of social choice rules in irrational societies (1986) (37)
The size of Firm and the Growth of Knowledge (1972) (35)
Gradient Methods for Constrained Maxima (1957) (34)
Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective (1987) (32)
Incentive aspects of decentralization (2005) (30)
On Informational Decentralization and Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms (1986) (30)
COMPETITIVE STABILITY UNDER WEAK GROSS SUBSTITUTABILITY: NONLINEAR PRICE ADJUSTMENT AND ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS (1962) (29)
VILLE AXIOMS AND CONSUMER THEORY (1979) (29)
Balanced Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points for Two or More Agents (1979) (29)
Reduction of Constrained Maxima to Saddle-point Problems (2014) (28)
An Integrability Condition, with Applications to Utility Theory and Thermodynamics (1979) (27)
On the Boundedness of the Feasible Set Without Convexity Assumptions (1973) (25)
Theory of the Firm and of Investment (1946) (24)
Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for resource-allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded (1985) (21)
Implicit Functions and Diffeomorphisms without C1 (2003) (20)
Stochastic Models of Economic Fluctuations (1944) (14)
Optimal intertemporal allocation mechanisms and decentralization of decisions (1988) (13)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: General introduction (1977) (13)
Socialism and incentives: Developing a framework (1979) (11)
A Gradient Method for Approximating Saddle Points and Constrained Maxima (2014) (11)
Markets and democracy: participation, accountability and efficiency: Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional change (1993) (11)
A necessary condition for decentralization and an application to intertemporal allocation (1990) (11)
On the demand generated by a smooth and concavifiable preference ordering (1987) (9)
Review: John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1948) (9)
3. Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Processes (1971) (8)
Catastrophe and Utilitarianism in the Development of Basic Science (1972) (8)
Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate Walrasian versus approximate Direct Revelation (2003) (8)
Game Theory and Decisions (1955) (8)
Errors and Shocks in Economic Relationships (1949) (8)
A NOTE ON THE LAGRANGIAN SADDLE-POINTS (1958) (7)
Mechanisms and Institutions (1989) (6)
Comparing finite mechanisms (2003) (5)
BASIC MATHEMATICAL AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE STUDY OF RHYTHMS AND NEAR‐RHYTHMS (1962) (5)
Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching (2001) (5)
Approximating a function by choosing a covering of its domain and ? points from its range (1988) (4)
Information and Incentives in Designing Non-wasteful Resource Allocation Systems (1985) (4)
Social Absorption Capability and Economic Development (1995) (4)
Optimization and Lagrange Multipliers: Non-C1 Constraints and "Minimal" Constraint Qualifications (1995) (4)
Stability of competitive-equilibrium (1977) (4)
The Second Welfare Theorem of Classical Welfare Economics (2001) (3)
Time Series of Patents Classified by Industry, United States, 1837 to 1957 (1972) (3)
The informational efficiency of finite price mechanisms (2004) (3)
Foundations of price dynamics (1977) (3)
On the Stability of the Tatonnement Approach to Competitive Equilibrium (1986) (3)
Effects of Entry on Profits under Monopolistic Competition (1989) (2)
Mechanism Design without Games (2003) (2)
CONSTRUCTION OF OUTCOME FUNCTIONS GUARANTEEING (1978) (2)
Oral History III: An Interview (1987) (2)
Programming Involving Infinitely Many Variables and Constraints (1967) (2)
original papers: Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching (2001) (2)
Landmark Papers in Economic Fluctuations, Economic Policy and Related Subjects (2002) (1)
On Transversals and Systems of Distinct Representatives (1997) (1)
Economics: nobel prize for 1970 awarded to samuelson of m.I.T. (1970) (1)
The negative externalities of the electricity industry and sustainability (2011) (1)
The price mechanism, decentralization, and incentives (1991) (1)
Cores, Almost Competitive Prices, and the Approximate Optimality of Walrasian Allocations in Discrete Spaces (1995) (1)
Designing Economic Mechanisms: Mechanisms and Mechanism Design (2006) (1)
ON GRADIENT METHODS FOR APPROACHING CONSTRAINED MAXIMA (1957) (0)
A Necessary Condition for Decentralizability and an Application to Intemporal Allocation (1987) (0)
Some Problems Arising in Estimating Economic Relations (1947) (0)
Technological change and the Law of Industrial Growth1 (1972) (0)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Competitive stability under weak gross substitutability (1977) (0)
Forecasting Postwar Demand: Discussion (1945) (0)
An Essay in Modeling of Institutional Change (2007) (0)
Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy (2006) (0)
‘Partners in Crime’: an Interview (1987) (0)
Discussion: Analytic Framework for Measuring Social Costs (1962) (0)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: The handling of nonconvexities (1977) (0)
Major Industrial Categories covered in Time Series (1972) (0)
Designing Economic Mechanisms: From Goals to Means: Constructing Mechanisms (2006) (0)
Industrial classification of patent office subclasses (1972) (0)
Stability in oligopoly (1977) (0)
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Dynamic characterization (1977) (0)
Editors' Note on Sources and Methods (1972) (0)
A Revealed Preference Feasibility Condition for Weak Complementarity (2009) (0)
DECENTRALIZATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, AND DEMAND THEORY. (1968) (0)
Early Experiments in Consumer Demand Theory: 1930-1970 (2004) (0)
Designing Economic Mechanisms: Introduction (2006) (0)
Danforth Uri Ben-Zion Vernon W . Ruttan Uri Ben-Zion Yash (2009) (0)
Designing Economic Mechanisms: Revelation Mechanisms (2006) (0)
Designing Informationally Efficient Mechanisms Using the Language of Sets (2006) (0)

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Other Resources About Leonid Hurwicz

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Leonid Hurwicz?

Leonid Hurwicz is affiliated with the following schools:

What Are Leonid Hurwicz's Academic Contributions?

Leonid Hurwicz is most known for their academic work in the field of economics. They are also known for their academic work in the fields of and mathematics.

Leonid Hurwicz has made the following academic contributions:

Designing Economic Mechanisms

Leonid Hurwicz's Academic­Influence.com Rankings

Why Is Leonid Hurwicz Influential?

Leonid Hurwicz's Published Works

Published Works

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What Schools Are Affiliated With Leonid Hurwicz?

What Are Leonid Hurwicz's Academic Contributions?

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Leonid Hurwicz's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings