Michael Tye | Academic Influence

Michael Tye 's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Michael Tye

Philosophy

#368

World Rank

#795

Historical Rank

#169

USA Rank

Logic

#729

World Rank

#1249

Historical Rank

#259

USA Rank

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Philosophy

Michael Tye 's Degrees

Bachelors Philosophy University of Oxford

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Why Is Michael Tye Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Michael Tye is a British philosopher who is currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He has made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind. Education and career Tye completed his undergraduate education at Oxford University in England, studying first physics and then physics and philosophy. He went on to complete a PhD in philosophy at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. Before moving to Texas, Tye taught at Haverford College in suburban Philadelphia and Temple University in Philadelphia proper. He was also a visiting professor at King's College, London for some ten consecutive years while at Temple and briefly took up a chair at the University of St. Andrews. In 2023, Tye met with the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala at a conference dedicated to the topic of animal consciousness. Besides philosophy of mind, Tye has interests in cognitive science, metaphysics, and philosophical logic, especially problems relating to vagueness.

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Michael Tye 's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Consciousness, Color, and Content (2000) (878)
Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995) (600)
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind (1997) (575)
Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience (2002) (291)
The Imagery Debate. (1994) (187)
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (2008) (184)
Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness (1994) (162)
Phenomenal consciousness: the explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion (1999) (145)
Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity (2003) (143)
A REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF PAINS AND THEIR PHENOMENAL CHARACTER (1995) (126)
Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain (2006) (119)
Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access? (1998) (105)
TRACKING REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE PAINFULNESS OF PAIN (2011) (103)
The Contents of Experience: Visual qualia and visual content (1992) (99)
On the Nonconceptual Content of Experience (2005) (84)
The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience (1984) (84)
Qualia ain’t in the head (2006) (82)
Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts (2012) (75)
Is there a phenomenology of thought (2011) (72)
Another Look at Representationalism about Pain (2004) (71)
Of colors, kestrels, caterpillars, and leaves (2001) (70)
A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts (2003) (69)
Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism (2014) (63)
The puzzle of true blue (2006) (61)
The Experience of Emotion : an Intentionalist Theory (2008) (59)
Is Experiencing Just Representing?@@@Ten Problems of Consciousness (1998) (58)
Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts (2012) (57)
Externalism, twin earth, and self-knowledge (1998) (56)
Naturalism and the Mental (1992) (50)
The subjective qualities of experience (1986) (50)
Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content (2007) (47)
Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness (1993) (42)
The Metaphysics of Mind. (1990) (41)
PAINS AND REASONS: WHY IT IS RATIONAL TO KILL THE MESSENGER (2014) (41)
ATTENTION, SEEING, AND CHANGE BLINDNESS (2010) (39)
Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum (1994) (38)
Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? (2016) (37)
The Imagery Debate. (1993) (32)
A Causal Analysis of Seeing (1982) (30)
Perceptual Experience Is a Many-Layered Thing (1996) (30)
A new look at the speckled hen (2009) (30)
Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap (1995) (29)
Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism (1998) (27)
The Picture Theory of Mental Images (1988) (26)
Vagueness: Welcome to the Quicksand (1995) (26)
Vagueness and Reality (2000) (23)
Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality (1994) (23)
THE ADMISSIBLE CONTENTS OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE (2009) (22)
The function of consciousness (1996) (21)
Philosophical Problems of Consciousness (2007) (21)
THE ADVERBIAL THEORY: A DEFENCE OF SELLARS AGAINST JACKSON (1975) (21)
The Debate about Mental Imagery (1984) (19)
On the location of a pain (2002) (19)
The truth about true blue (2006) (18)
I–Michael Tye (1998) (18)
Why the vague need not be higher-order vague (1994) (18)
Supervaluationism and the law of excluded middle (1989) (17)
The Problem of Common Sensibles (2007) (17)
The puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus (1978) (16)
Against the token identity theory (1985) (16)
Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem (2006) (15)
Representationalist Theories of Consciousness (2009) (15)
The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? (1997) (15)
True blue redux (2007) (15)
Minds and Persons: A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts (2003) (13)
Yes, Phenomenal Character Really Is Out There In The World (2015) (13)
Cohen on Color Relationism (2012) (12)
I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of Concepts (2011) (12)
Phenomenal externalism, lolita, and the planet xenon (2015) (11)
Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs (2017) (11)
DON ’ T PANIC : Tye ’ s Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness (2002) (11)
Knowing What It Is Like (2012) (11)
On the possibility of disembodied existence (1983) (11)
EXTERNALISM AND MEMORY (2016) (10)
Fuzzy realism and the problem of the many (1996) (10)
Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness (1993) (10)
Up close with the speckled hen (2010) (9)
Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness (2021) (9)
On an objection to the synonymy principle of property identity (1981) (9)
Are Pains Feelings (2017) (9)
Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary (1996) (9)
Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention (2014) (9)
Reply to Crane, Jackson and McLaughlin (2012) (8)
Functionalism and type physicalism (1983) (8)
Speaks on strong property representationalism (2014) (8)
What Acquaintance Teaches (2019) (7)
Are insects sentient (2016) (7)
A note on the synonymy principle of property identity (1982) (6)
Two Cheers for Representationalism@@@Ten Problems of Consciousness (1998) (5)
Consciousness Constrained : A Commentary on Being No One (2005) (5)
On the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness (1997) (5)
Causal Roles and Higher-Order Properties@@@Ten Problems of Consciousness (1998) (4)
Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass (2021) (4)
In defense of the words ‘human body’ (1980) (3)
Proper Names and Definite Descriptions with Widest Possible Scope (1980) (3)
Mental Reality by Galen Strawson (1996) (3)
On the Virtue of Being Poised – Reply to Seager (2003) (3)
Brand on event identity (1979) (3)
Precis of Ten Prolems of Consciousness@@@Ten Problems of Consciousness (1998) (3)
Oh Yes it is (2001) (3)
Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (2000) (3)
Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibility (2007) (3)
What What It's Like Is Really Like (1995) (2)
Counting concepts: Response to paul boghossian (2015) (2)
SUPERVENIENCE, MATERIALISM, AND FUNCTIONALISM: COMMENTS ON HORGAN (1984) (2)
How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience (2019) (2)
Is Privileged Access Incompatible with Content-Externalism? (1998) (2)
The Nature of Pain and the Appearance/Reality Distinction (2015) (2)
The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion : Reply to (2001) (2)
Do Fish have Feelings (2017) (1)
Solving the Puzzles (2008) (1)
The Panic Theory – Reply to Byrne (2003) (1)
Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World (1988) (1)
Phenomenal Character and Color – Reply to Maund (2003) (1)
Scientific reduction and the synonymy principle of property identity (1981) (1)
Overview of an Originalist Theory of Concepts (2012) (1)
Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions : A Reply to Byrne and Tye (2006) (1)
Fading Qualia : A Response to Michael (2018) (1)
Crustacean Pain (2022) (1)
Filling In and the Nature of Visual Experience (2020) (1)
What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us (2019) (1)
A Paradox of Consciousness (2021) (0)
Why Consciousness Cannot Be Physical and Why It Must Be (2008) (0)
UTILITARIANISM AND RATIONALITY (2016) (0)
Notes on Contributors (2003) (0)
Book reviews (1985) (0)
Of Birds and Reptiles (And Fish) (2017) (0)
Experience and Consciousness (2017) (0)
The Sense of “Looks” (2019) (0)
The Originalist Theory Defended and Elaborated (2012) (0)
A New Argument against Biological Theories (2010) (0)
Consciousness, Seeing, and Knowing (2008) (0)
The Girl Who Can’t Feel Pain (2017) (0)
Precis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts (2012) (0)
Response to Discussants@@@Ten Problems of Consciousness (1998) (0)
Consciousness in the Sun@@@Locating Consciousness (1997) (0)
Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism (2013) (0)
PHS volume 34 Cover and Front matter (1993) (0)
BRIE GERTLER A DEFENSE OF THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT (1997) (0)
Change Blindness and the Refrigerator Light Illusion (2008) (0)
The Puzzles Solved (2012) (0)
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness1 (2004) (0)
Transparency and Representationalism (2021) (0)
Experience and its Limits (2017) (0)
AND THE ARGUMENT FROM NO COMMON CONTENT (2007) (0)
Reasoning about other Species (2017) (0)
Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism (2008) (0)
A: Adverbial Theory (2009) (0)
The Ethical Treatment of Animals (2017) (0)
The Grand Illusion (2018) (0)
Reply to Yu (1981) (0)
PM 6 Counting concepts : response to Paul (2015) (0)
Representationalism and Panpsychism (2021) (0)
Russellian Monism to the Rescue? (2021) (0)
BERGMANN ON THE INTENTIONALITY OF THOUGHT (1977) (0)
Concept Externalism, Originalism and Privileged Access (2012) (0)
Christopher Peacocke , Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations . Reviewed by (1985) (0)
M: Mental/physical (2009) (0)
The Metaphysics of Thought (2012) (0)
Erratum: Consciousness, Color, and Content (Minds and Machines 13 (449-452)) (2004) (0)
Commander Data and Robot Rabbit (2017) (0)
Introduction (2021) (0)
Our Friends and Neighbors (2017) (0)
Physicalism and the Appeal to Phenomenal Concepts (2008) (0)
It’s Got to Be Human! (2017) (0)
Speaks on strong property representationalism (2013) (0)
Further Applications: Originalism and Experience (2012) (0)
Objections and Replies (2012) (0)
Roads Not Taken (2012) (0)
The Explanatory Gap Argument and Phenomenal States : A Defense of Physicalism Fasiku Gbenga (2012) (0)
The Location of Consciousness (2021) (0)
Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism (2010) (0)
Richard Arneson University of California, San Diego Alison Leigh Brown Northern Arizona University (2000) (0)

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