Timothy Williamson

Timothy Williamson's AcademicInfluence.com Rankings

Timothy Williamson

Philosophy

#59

World Rank

#187

Historical Rank

Epistemology

#18

World Rank

#25

Historical Rank

Mathematical Logic

#14

World Rank

#25

Historical Rank

Metaphysics

#12

World Rank

#27

Historical Rank

philosophy Degrees

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Philosophy

Timothy Williamson's Degrees

Bachelors Mathematics and Philosophy University of Oxford
PhD Philosophy University of Oxford

Why Is Timothy Williamson Influential?

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According to Wikipedia, Timothy Williamson is a British philosopher whose main research interests are in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. He is the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford, and fellow of New College, Oxford.

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Timothy Williamson's Published Works

Number of citations in a given year to any of this author's works

Total number of citations to an author for the works they published in a given year. This highlights publication of the most important work(s) by the author

Published Works

Knowledge and Its Limits (2000) (1809)
Parts. A Study in Ontology (1990) (618)
Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2013) (593)
The Philosophy of Philosophy (2022) (487)
Knowing and Asserting (1996) (427)
Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge (2005) (201)
Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement (2005) (186)
Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives (2009) (162)
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERTISE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF (2011) (156)
I —ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING* (2005) (131)
Never say never (1994) (121)
On the structure of higher-order vagueness (1999) (117)
Necessary Existents (2002) (115)
Necessary Existents (2002) (115)
Identity and Discrimination. (1990) (113)
Very Improbable Knowing (2014) (103)
How probable is an infinite sequence of heads (2007) (102)
Williamson on knowledge (2009) (88)
Generalizing the Lottery Paradox (2006) (85)
Knowledge as Evidence (1997) (84)
Counterparts and Actuality (2005) (79)
Knowing by Imagining (2016) (77)
On the psychology of vague predicates (1999) (77)
Modal science (2016) (76)
Replies to Critics (2009) (75)
II—Timothy Williamson: Understanding and Inference (2003) (74)
Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic (2013) (73)
Probability and Danger (2009) (69)
Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula (2005) (68)
Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality (2014) (68)
Vagueness and Ignorance (1992) (66)
Existence and Contingency (2000) (66)
Logic, Thought and Language: Necessary Existents (2002) (62)
Blind Reasoning (2020) (61)
Imagination, Stipulation and Vagueness (1997) (58)
Is Knowing a State of Mind (1995) (57)
On Being Justified in One's Head (2007) (56)
Vagueness in Reality (2005) (54)
How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge (2012) (54)
Quantifiers and context-dependence (1995) (50)
Knowability and Constructivism (1988) (50)
Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic (2013) (49)
“Conceptual Truth” (2006) (46)
INDICATIVE VERSUS SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS, CONGRUENTIAL VERSUS NON-HYPERINTENSIONAL CONTEXTS (2006) (45)
A completeness theorem for unrestricted first- order languages (2003) (43)
PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWLEDGE OF COUNTERFACTUALS (2007) (41)
First-order logics for comparative similarity (1988) (41)
Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg (2009) (40)
Comments on Michael Williams' Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards (2001) (39)
A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic (2015) (39)
Necessitism, Contingentism, and Plural Quantification (2010) (38)
Replies to Commentators (2005) (34)
On the Paradox of Knowability (1987) (34)
Tennant on Knowable Truth (2000) (33)
Model‐Building in Philosophy (2017) (32)
Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy (2016) (32)
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox (2010) (32)
Definiteness and knowability (1995) (32)
How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention (1996) (31)
How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention (1996) (31)
VII—Equivocation and Existence (1988) (30)
Precis of Vagueness@@@Vagueness. (1997) (30)
The Necessary Framework of Objects (2000) (30)
Verificationism and non-distributive knowledge (1993) (30)
Conditionalizing on Knowledge (1998) (30)
Strong Boethius’ Thesis and Consequential Implication (1997) (29)
Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases (2000) (27)
Reply to Commentators (1997) (27)
Soames on Vagueness (2002) (27)
Scepticism and Evidence (2000) (26)
DOES ASSERTIBILITY SATISFY THE S4 AXIOM (1995) (25)
Reply to McGee and McLaughlin (2004) (24)
Abductive Philosophy: ABDUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY (2016) (24)
Reply to Boghossian (2011) (24)
Criteria of Identity and the Axiom of Choice (1986) (24)
Tennant’s Troubles (2006) (23)
Suppose and Tell (2020) (23)
PUTNAM ON THE SORTTES PARADOX (1996) (23)
The Broadness of the Mental: Some Logical Considerations (1998) (23)
Why Epistemology Cannot be Operationalized (2008) (22)
An Alternative Rule of disjunction in modal logic (1991) (22)
KNOWLEDGE FIRST EPISTEMOLOGY (2010) (22)
How did we get here from there? The transformation of analytic philosophy (2014) (22)
Absolute Provability and Safe Knowledge of Axioms (2016) (20)
Knowledge and Scepticism (2007) (20)
Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components (2006) (19)
Necessary Identity and Necessary Existence (1990) (18)
Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic (2010) (17)
Modalities. Philosophical Essays (1995) (17)
Ethics, supervenience and Ramsey sentences (2001) (17)
Identity and Discrimination: Williamson/Identity (2013) (16)
Knowledge, Credence, and the Strength of Belief (version of 31 May, 2020, to appear in Amy Flowerree and Baron Reed (eds.), Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social World, London: Routledge) (2020) (16)
Why Safety Doesn't save Closure (2012) (16)
Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals (2020) (16)
Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law (2002) (16)
Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality (2006) (15)
Representing the knowledge of turing machines (1994) (15)
Modern Anti-Realism and Manufactured Truth (1989) (14)
Some admissible rules in nonnormal modal systems (1993) (14)
AMBIGUOUS RATIONALITY (2017) (13)
Counterpossibles in Semantics and Metaphysics (2017) (13)
Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness (1996) (13)
Schiffer on the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness (1999) (13)
The contingents a priori: has it anything to do with indexicals? (1986) (12)
Sporting participation following the operative management of chondral defects of the knee at mid-term follow up: a systematic review and meta-analysis (2020) (11)
Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference (2012) (11)
Debating the A Priori (2020) (11)
What makes it a heap? (1996) (10)
Replies to Kornblith, Jackson and Moore (2009) (10)
Why Epistemology Can ’ t be Operationalized (2006) (10)
Continuum Many Maximal Consistent Normal Bimodal Logics with Inverses (1998) (10)
Evidence of Evidence in Epistemic Logic (2019) (10)
Reply to Commentators: [Horgan, Gomez-Torrente, Tye] (1997) (9)
Bivalence and subjunctive conditionals (1988) (9)
Inverses for Normal Modal Operators (1997) (9)
On knowledge of the unknowable (1987) (9)
ALTERNATIVE LOGICS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS (2018) (9)
Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics (1990) (9)
Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong (2015) (8)
Replies to Bricker, Divers, and Sullivan (2014) (8)
Some philosophical aspects of reasoning about knowledge (2001) (8)
Evidence in Philosophy (2008) (8)
Epistemicist Models: Comments on Gómez‐Torrente and Graff (2002) (8)
Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic (2015) (8)
Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy (2009) (7)
Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction . By Joshua Alexander. Polity Press, 2012, pp. vi+154, £15.99. ISBN-13: 978-0745649184 (2013) (7)
Reply to Horwich (2011) (7)
Conditional Excluded Middle in Systems of Consequential Implication (2005) (7)
Non-genuine MacIntosh logics (1994) (7)
Précis of Knowledge and its Limits (2005) (6)
The Infinite Commitment of Finite Minds (1984) (6)
Assertion, denial and some cancellation rules in modal logic (1988) (6)
Verification, Falsification, and Cancellation in KT (1990) (6)
Reply to Sider (2016) (6)
Conditionals and Actuality (2009) (6)
Peter SIMONS, Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. xiv + 390. (1990) (5)
Philosophical Method: A Very Short Introduction (2020) (5)
i. What Is Naturalism? (2013) (5)
Reply to Vetter (2016) (5)
Determinism, Counterfactuals, and Decision (2020) (5)
A note on truth, satisfaction and the empty domain (1999) (5)
Sense, Validity and Context (1997) (5)
Rate and Timing of Return to Golf After Hip, Knee, or Shoulder Arthroplasty: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis (2022) (4)
Skepticism, Semantic Externalism, and Keith's Mom (2000) (4)
Some Computational Constraints in Epistemic Logic (2016) (4)
Review of Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (2014) (4)
Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths (2019) (4)
Supervaluationism and good reasoning (2018) (4)
Modality as a Subject for Science (2017) (4)
HORGAN ON VAGUENESS (2002) (4)
Anti-Exceptionalism about Philosophy (2013) (4)
Peacocke's theory of modality (2002) (4)
Reply to Peacocke (2011) (3)
Dummett on the Relation between Logics and Metalogics (2017) (3)
Counterpossibles (2016) (3)
Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning (2018) (3)
Self-knowledge and embedded operators (1996) (3)
VAGUENESS, INDETERMINACY AND SOCIAL MEANING (2001) (3)
Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012, xv + 225 pp. ISBN 978-0-1996-6112-1 pb £16.99 (2013) (3)
Margins for Error: A Reply (2000) (3)
Invertible definitions (1987) (3)
The counterfactual-based approach to modal epistemology (2020) (3)
Knowledge Within the Margin for Error (2007) (3)
Functional outcomes and complications following combined locking plate and tunneled suspensory device fixation of lateral-end clavicle nonunions. (2021) (3)
Model-Building as a Philosophical Method (2018) (3)
Continuous walking and time- and intensity-matched interval walking: Cardiometabolic demand and post-exercise enjoyment in insufficiently active, healthy adults (2020) (3)
Law-Abiding Causal Decision Theory (2021) (3)
Replies to King, deRosset and Kment (2016) (2)
Wright and Casalegno on Meaning and Assertibility (2012) (2)
Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? (2020) (2)
Modality & Other Matters: An Interview with Timothy Williamson (2010) (2)
Do the outcomes of hip arthroscopy for femoroacetabular impingement change over time? (2021) (2)
Reply to Bacon, Hawthorne and Uzquiano (2016) (2)
11 Conclusion (1978) (2)
Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1 (2020) (2)
Semantic Paradox and Semantic Change (2000) (2)
Defining the Patient Acceptable Symptom State Using the Forgotten Joint Score 12 After Hip Arthroscopy (2021) (2)
The Future of Philosophy (2018) (2)
Knowledge of Counterfactuals (2009) (2)
Hyman on Knowledge and Ability (2018) (2)
On rigidity and persistence (1988) (2)
Reply to Goodman (2016) (2)
Epistemological Consequences of Frege Puzzles (2022) (2)
The KK principle and rotational symmetry (2020) (2)
How vagueness could cut out at any order (2012) (2)
Bone grafting for scaphoid nonunion surgery : a systematic review and meta-analysis. (2022) (1)
Reply to Linnebo (2016) (1)
Knowing How Journal of Philosophy 98.8 (2001) (2006) (1)
Unreflective Realism@@@Truth and Objectivity. (1996) (1)
Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality (2008) (1)
In Memoriam: Ruth Barcan Marcus 1921–2012 (2013) (1)
Spaces of Possibility (2018) (1)
Thinking Deeply, Contributing Originally : An Interview with Timothy Williamson(Special Contribution) (2009) (1)
Some Admissible Rules in Modal Systems with the Brouwerian Axiom (1996) (1)
Vagueness: A Global Approach, by Kit Fine (2020) (1)
Sosa on Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism (2004) (1)
Penelope Maddy: What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy (2017) (1)
Reply to Yli-Vakkuri (2016) (1)
Anthropocentrism and truth (1987) (1)
Logic and Existence [Corrected Portion of an Article appearing in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 73 (1999)] (2000) (1)
Reply to Machina and Deutsch on vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error (2002) (1)
Reply to Stalnaker (2011) (1)
Edgington on Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth (2021) (1)
Criteria of Identity (2013) (1)
The contingent a priori: a reply (1988) (1)
Preoperative morbidity and joint awareness while awaiting hip arthroscopy for femoroacetabular impingement (2021) (1)
The Clinical Frailty Scale can be used retrospectively to assess the frailty of patients with hip fracture: a validation study (2022) (1)
Inferentialism and the Epistemology of Logic (2020) (0)
Realism and the Burden of Proof (1986) (0)
Notes (to the First Edition) (2013) (0)
More on the Interaction of ‘Would’ with Context (2020) (0)
Critical Notices (2002) (0)
Critical Notices Is Knowing a State of Mind ? Knowledge and its Limits (2003) (0)
Metaphysics and Higher-Order Modal Logic (2011) (0)
5. Doing thought experiments (2020) (0)
Additional References (to the Revised Edition) (2013) (0)
Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge (2020) (0)
Précis of Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2014) (0)
The semantics/pragmatics distinction: a defence of Grice (2006) (0)
Iterated attitudes. Commentary (1998) (0)
Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths (2019) (0)
24.09x Minds and Machines (2015) (0)
Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference1 (2020) (0)
Some Computationalconstraints In Epistemic Logic (2004) (0)
7. Deducing (2020) (0)
Locke on particles: a reply to Nuchelmans (1988) (0)
Appendix 2: Counterfactual Donkeys (2008) (0)
Conditionals and Abduction (2020) (0)
Very Improbable Knowing (2014) (0)
Understanding and Inference1 (2020) (0)
Theorizing about evidence (2022) (0)
799 Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decisions in Neck of Femur Fractures – Is Documentation Adequate? (2021) (0)
The Interaction of ‘If’ and ‘Would’ (2020) (0)
Vagueness : Language vs . Logic (2004) (0)
Logics of Phenomenal Character (2013) (0)
Reply to Fritz (2016) (0)
CHAPTER 18 A State of Mind (2015) (0)
1. Introduction (2020) (0)
9. Using other fields (2020) (0)
Objects, Properties and Contingent Existence* (to appear as ‘Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic’ in M. Frauchiger and W.K. Essler, eds., Themes from Barcan Marcus (Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, vol. 3), Frankfurt, Paris: Ebikon, Lancaster, New Brunswick: ontos verlag (2009) (0)
Intensional Comprehension Principles and Metaphysics (2013) (0)
Interactions between Plain Conditionals and Quantifiers (2020) (0)
Is ‘Would If’ Hyperintensional? (2020) (0)
Philosophy and Common Sense 2: Cultivating Curiosity Instead of a hopeless search for (0)
Doing Thought Experiments (2019) (0)
The Philosophy of PhilosophyBy Timothy WilliamsonBlackwell, 2007. x + 332 pp. £ 15.99 paperSummary (2009) (0)
Theorizing about evidence (2022) (0)
Mappings between Contingentist and Necessitist Discourse (2013) (0)
Taking Philosophical Questions at Face Value (2008) (0)
Thinking about talking (1998) (0)
Natural language variables: variable-based semantic theories of pronouns and proper names (2012) (0)
Knowing by Imagining1 (2020) (0)
Paradoxes of Phenomenal Character (2013) (0)
The Barcan Formula and its Converse: Early Developments (2013) (0)
Worlds and Meaning (2020) (0)
The fragile state: essays on luminosity, normativity and metaphilosophy (2013) (0)
A Plea for Inexact Truthmaking∗ forthcoming in Linguistics and Philosophy (2019) (0)
Reply to Fine (2016) (0)
The Value of Conditionals (2020) (0)
The Suppositional Rule (2020) (0)
Logics of Indiscriminability (2013) (0)
Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again1 (2020) (0)
EVIDENCE AND TRANSMISSION FAILURE (0)
Reply to Boghossian on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori1 (2020) (0)
The Interaction of ‘If’ and ‘Would’: Semantics and Logic (2020) (0)
1. Rashi's view (2006) (0)
Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1 (2020) (0)
Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity (2008) (0)
Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality* (penultimate Version) (2010) (0)
Acting on knowledge-how (2022) (0)
The Role of Conditional Propositions (2020) (0)
3. Disputing (2020) (0)
4. Clarifying terms (2020) (0)
A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic (2014) (0)
Consequences of the Suppositional Rule (2020) (0)
Closing Reflections1 (2020) (0)
Hemos superado el giro lingüístico (2007) (0)
Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori Once Again1 (2020) (0)
Modal and Temporal Paradoxes (2013) (0)
Knowing and Believing, Acting and Intending (2015) (0)
8. Using the history of philosophy (2020) (0)
Analyticity Reconsidered1 (2020) (0)
Truth and Borderline Cases (2004) (0)
Lloyd Humberstone Inverses for Normal Timothy Williamson Modal Operators (1997) (0)
Published in The Aristotelian Society supplementary volume 77 (2003), pp. 249-93 BLIND REASONING (2004) (0)
Conclusion (2020) (0)
Possible Worlds Model Theory (2013) (0)
Reply to Boghossian on the A Priori and the Analytic1 (2020) (0)
Margin for Error1 (2017) (0)
SCH1fi'fi'ER ON THE EPISTEMIC THEORY OF VAGUENESS (2016) (0)
Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity (2008) (0)
A State of Mind (2002) (0)
Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality (2013) (0)
Margins and Iterations (2002) (0)
Decision theory (and a little of that human touch) (2019) (0)
Heuristics within Heuristics (2020) (0)
Logics of Provability (1996) (0)
Accepting a Logic, Accepting a Theory (2021) (0)
Reply to Sullivan (2016) (0)
Laudatio: Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921‒2012) (2015) (0)
Vagueness in the world (2002) (0)
10. Model-building (2020) (0)
To appear in: G (2005) (0)
Conclusion: Semantics, Heuristics, Pragmatics (2020) (0)
Concepts of Phenomenal Character (2013) (0)
Decision theory (and a little of that human touch) (2019) (0)
Appendix 1: Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic (2008) (0)
Abduction, perception, emotion, feeling: Body maps and pattern recognition (2021) (0)
Golf participation after rotator cuff repair: functional outcomes, rate of return and factors associated with return to play. (2023) (0)
Reply to Dennett, Knobe, Kuznetsov, and Stoljar on Philosophical Methodology (2019) (0)
Appendix: Maximal M‐Relations and the Axiom of Choice (2013) (0)
Reply to Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1 (2020) (0)
Philosophy and Common Sense I : What Is Common Sense ? (0)
Unexceptional Moral Knowledge (2022) (0)
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY COUNCIL (2005) (0)
HOW DID WE GET HERE FROM THERE? THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY1 (2011) (0)
Gibbard on meaning and normativity (2018) (0)
Counterpossibles in Semantics and Metaphysics [Special Issue] (2017) (0)
Additional Notes (to the Revised Edition) (2013) (0)
Contingentism and Necessitism (2013) (0)
Logical deviance and semantic competence (2007) (0)
References (to the First Edition) (2013) (0)
Replies to Trobok, Smokrović, and Miščević on the Philosophy of Philosophy (2013) (0)
Paradoxes of Indiscriminability (2013) (0)
How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?1 (2020) (0)
Thought Experiments and ‘Would’ (2020) (0)
Draft of Paper to Appear in a Festschrift For (2005) (0)
Metametaphysics and semantics (2021) (0)
From First-Order to Higher-Order Modal Logic (2013) (0)
One can get a feel for the oddness of the hybrid view by considering a theorist (2016) (0)
Concepts of Indiscriminability (2013) (0)
Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus . Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman and Nicholas Asher, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. (1996) (0)
6. Comparing theories (2020) (0)
‘ Philosophical Intuitions ’ Knobe ’ s title is ‘ Philosophical Intuitions are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences (0)
The Linguistic Turn and the Conceptual Turn (2008) (0)
A risky challenge for intransitive preferences (2023) (0)
Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science? (2021) (0)
Predication and Modality (2013) (0)
On Necessary Individuals and Ways (sic!) for Them to Be: Celebrating 10-Year Anniversary of Modal Logic as Metaphysics (2023) (0)
Conditional Testimony (2020) (0)
Closing Reflections (2020) (0)
Consequences of Necessitism (2013) (0)
More Challenges (2020) (0)
2. Starting from common sense (2020) (0)

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