Deborah Mayo
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American philosopher
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Deborah Mayophilosophy Degrees
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#967
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Epistemology
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Logic
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Philosophy
Deborah Mayo's Degrees
- PhD Philosophy University of California, San Diego
- Masters Philosophy University of California, San Diego
- Bachelors Philosophy University of California, San Diego
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Why Is Deborah Mayo Influential?
(Suggest an Edit or Addition)According to Wikipedia, Deborah G. Mayo is an American philosopher of science and author. She is a professor emerita in the Department of Philosophy at Virginia Tech and holds a visiting appointment at the Center for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science of the London School of Economics.
Deborah Mayo's Published Works
Published Works
- Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (1996) (393)
- Justify your alpha (2018) (289)
- Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction (2006) (262)
- Statistical Inference as Severe Testing (2018) (189)
- Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management (1994) (177)
- Novel Evidence and Severe Tests (1991) (115)
- Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference (2006) (112)
- Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing (2004) (110)
- Introduction and Background (2009) (100)
- Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (2009) (91)
- Models of Group Selection (1987) (63)
- Error Statistics and Learning from Error: Making a Virtue of Necessity (1997) (60)
- Principles of Inference and Their Consequences (2001) (55)
- Behavioristic, Evidentialist, and Learning Models of Statistical Testing (1985) (52)
- Philosophy of Science Association (2008) (50)
- Experimental Practice and an Error Statistical Account of Evidence (2000) (43)
- Duhem's Problem, the Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or "What's Belief Got to Do with It?" (1997) (42)
- PHILOSOPHY OF STATISTICS. (1979) (39)
- Objectivity and conditionality in frequentist inference (2010) (33)
- Rejoinder: "On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle" (2013) (31)
- In Defense of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals (1981) (31)
- An Error-Statistical Philosophy of Evidence (2004) (27)
- An objective theory of statistical testing (1983) (25)
- Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn's-eye View of Popper's Demarcation of Science (1996) (25)
- Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis (2010) (24)
- The New Experimentalism, Topical Hypotheses, and Learning from Error (1994) (23)
- Response to Howson and Laudan (1997) (23)
- Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontology (2015) (22)
- ONE Learning from Error , Severe Testing , and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge (2011) (22)
- TESTING STATISTICAL TESTING (1981) (21)
- An Error in the Argument from Conditionality and Sufficiency to the Likelihood Principle (2011) (20)
- SEVERE TESTS, ARGUING FROM ERROR, AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERDETERMINATION (1997) (19)
- Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics? (1992) (16)
- How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts: Some Clarifications (2008) (15)
- CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND ITS FAILURE TO WITHSTAND CRITICAL SCRUTINY (2006) (13)
- The statistics wars and intellectual conflicts of interest (2021) (12)
- P‐value thresholds: Forfeit at your peril (2019) (12)
- Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk (1988) (12)
- Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)? (2011) (11)
- On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics (1982) (11)
- Philosophy of Science Association Toward a More (1998) (11)
- Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence (2006) (10)
- The error-statistical philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics: comments on Gelman and Shalizi: 'Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics'. (2013) (9)
- Error and Inference: Learning from Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge (2009) (9)
- Statistical significance and its critics: practicing damaging science, or damaging scientific practice? (2022) (9)
- Cartwright, Causality, and Coincidence (1986) (9)
- Brownian Motion and the Appraisal of Theories (1988) (8)
- Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation (2011) (7)
- The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist (2008) (7)
- Increasing Public Participation in Controversies Involving Hazards: The Value of Metastatistical Rules (1985) (7)
- What is this thing called philosophy of science? (2000) (7)
- Some surprising facts about (the problem of) surprising facts (from the Dusseldorf Conference, February 2011). (2014) (7)
- Understanding frequency-dependent causation (1986) (7)
- Some Methodological Issues in Experimental Economics (2008) (6)
- P-Values on Trial: Selective Reporting of (Best Practice Guides Against) Selective Reporting (2020) (6)
- Discussion: Bayesian Methods: Applied? Yes. Philosophical Defense? In Flux (2013) (5)
- How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts 859 1 Severity and Use-Constructing : Four Points ( and Some Clarificatory Notes (2008) (5)
- Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations (2012) (5)
- Deborah Mayo Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science Part 2 : Shallow versus Deep Explorations (2012) (4)
- An Ad Hoc Save of a Theory of Adhocness ? Exchanges with John Worrall (2011) (4)
- Ontology & methodology (2015) (4)
- The Demonology of William of Auvergne (2006) (3)
- Against a Scientific Justification of Animal Experiments (1983) (3)
- A Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation between Sir David Cox and Deborah Mayo (as recorded, June, 2011) (2011) (3)
- Learning from Error: The Theoretical Significance of Experimental Knowledge (2010) (3)
- Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science: (2012) (2)
- When can risk-factor epidemiology provide reliable tests? (2004) (2)
- How Can We Cultivate Senn's Abilirty (2012) (2)
- The Philosophical Relevance of Statistics (1980) (2)
- Error and Inference: Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence (2009) (2)
- Philosophy of Science Association Cartwright , Causality , and Coincidence (2007) (1)
- An Ad Hoc Save of a Theory of Adhocness ? Exchanges with Worrall (2009) (1)
- 'Peirce-pectives' on metaphysics and the sciences (2005) (1)
- Experiment and Conceptual Change-Evidence, Data Generation, and Scientific Practice: Toward a Reliabilist Philosophy of Experiment-Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) (2000) (1)
- Induction and Severe Testing (2009) (1)
- Can Scientific Theories Be Warranted with Severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers (2011) (1)
- Significance Tests: Vitiated or Vindicated by the Replication Crisis in Psychology? (2020) (1)
- Some problems with Chow's problems with power (1998) (1)
- Error and Inference: Revisiting Critical Rationalism (2009) (1)
- Novel work on problems of novelty? Comments on Hudson (2003) (1)
- Philosophy of Science Association Philosophy of Science Association the New Experimentalism, Topical Hypotheses, and Learning from Error1 (2007) (1)
- Sins of the Epistemic Probabilist Exchanges with Peter Achinstein (2011) (1)
- Error and Inference: Introduction and Background (2009) (1)
- Toward Progressive Critical Rationalism Exchanges with (2011) (1)
- NewPerspectiveson (SomeOld) Problems of Frequentist Statistics (2009) (1)
- Remembering Sir David Cox, 1924–2022 (2022) (0)
- Philosophy of Science Association Models of Group Selection (2007) (0)
- Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontology (2015) (0)
- Error and Inference: Causal Modeling, Explanation and Severe Testing (2009) (0)
- 4.1 Commentary (2019) (0)
- The Experimental Side of Modeling (2018) (0)
- DEBORAH G (2011) (0)
- Significance Tests: Vitiated or Vindicated by the Replication Crisis in Psychology? (2020) (0)
- The Objective Epistemic Probabilist and the Severe Tester (2011) (0)
- II Explanation and Testing Exchanges with Clark Glymour (2011) (0)
- Rejecting Statistical Significance Tests: Defanging the Arguments (2020) (0)
- Some Recipes and Exercises With Tests, Type I and Type II errors, Size, Power, and Severity: November 2008 (2008) (0)
- 19 Models of Error and the Limits of Experimental Testing (2020) (0)
- An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing in Rationality and Objectivity: Philosophical and Psychological Conceptions (Part II). (1983) (0)
- Error and Inference: Error and Legal Epistemology (2009) (0)
- Introduction to recent issues in philosophy of statistics: evidence, testing, and applications (2023) (0)
- Justify your alpha (2018) (0)
- Excursion 1 How to Tell What ’ s True about Statistical Inference (2019) (0)
- Statistics, philosophy, and health: the SMAC 2021 webconference (2022) (0)
- Multiplicity and Unification in Frequentist ( Error ) Statistics : Learning from (2009) (0)
- Book Review:Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach Colin Howson, Peter Urbach (1991) (0)
- Error and Inference: The Life of Theory in the New Experimentalism (2009) (0)
- How to Tell What's True about Statistical Inference: A Philosophy Inquiry (1970) (0)
- Ontology & methodology (2015) (0)
- Critical Notice (2001) (0)
- The Myth of “The Myth of Objectivity” (2018) (0)
- Error and Inference: Preface (2009) (0)
- Title: Severe Tests in Neuroimaging: What We Can Learn and How We Can Learn It Abstract: Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging and several philosophers (2014) (0)
- A Solution to "The Problem of Socrates" in Nietzsche's Thought: An Explanation of Nietzsche's Ambivalence Toward Socrates (2004) (0)
- On the alleged ineffability of death. (1985) (0)
- Error and Inference: Frontmatter (2009) (0)
- DID P EARSON R EJECT T HE N EYMAN-PEARSON PHILOSOPHY OF STATISTICS?* (1992) (0)
- How Can We Cultivate Senn's Ability? Comment on Stephen Senn, "You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You're Probably Wrong" (2012) (0)
- New Perspectives on (Some Old) Problems of Frequentist Statistics I Frequentist Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference1 (2011) (0)
- How Everyone Can Have a Rare Property: Response to Sober on Frequency-Dependent Causation (1987) (0)
- Peirce's philosophy of inductive inference in science is based on the idea that what permits us to make progress in science, what allows our knowledge (2016) (0)
- Roles of Probability in Induction Inductive inference: the premises (background and evidence (2012) (0)
- Sir Harold Jeffreys’ (tail area) one-liner: Saturday night comedy (b) (2015) (0)
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What Schools Are Affiliated With Deborah Mayo?
Deborah Mayo is affiliated with the following schools: