#23659 Overall Influence

Israeli mathematician

Michael Bahir Maschler was an Israeli mathematician well known for his contributions to the field of game theory. He was a professor in the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel. In 2012, the Israeli Chapter of the Game Theory Society founded the Maschler Prize, an annual prize awarded to an outstanding research student in game theory and related topics in Israel.

Source: Wikipedia- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- THE BARGAINING SET FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game.
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Bankruptcy games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- THE BARGAINING SET FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game.
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Bankruptcy games
- The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
- Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
- The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game
- The kernel/nucleolus of a standard tree game
- The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
- The general nucleolus and the reduced game property
- Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
- Stable Sets and Stable Points of Set-Valued Dynamic Systems with Applications to Game Theory
- Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights–egalitarian solution
- PLAYING AN N-PERSON GAME, AN EXPERIMENT.
- An advantage of the bargaining set over the core
- The Power of a Coalition
- Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
- Spanning network games
- Chapter 3. Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games
- Bargaining and Group Decision Making--Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly
- The inspector's non‐constant‐sum game: Its dependence on a system of detectors
- The inequalities that determine the bargaining setM1(i)
- Essays in Game Theory, In Honor of Michael Maschler
- Simple flow games
- Minimal domains and their Bergman kernel function.
- n-Person games with only 1, n − 1, and n-person permissible coalitions☆
- Monotonic games are spanning network games
- Asymptotic stability and other properties of trajectories and transfer sequences leading to the bargaining sets
- The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member
- The nucleolus of a standard tree game revisited: a study of its monotonicity and computational properties
- The reactive bargaining set: structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games
- Insights into Game Theory: An Alternative Mathematical Experience
- Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play
- On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road
- Voting for voters: the unanimity case
- Classes of minimal and representative domains and their kernel functions
- Insights into Game Theory
- Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case
- APPLICATIONS OF STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. SECTIONS III AND V.
- The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games
- Game Theory: Notations
- STABLE PAYOFF CONFIGURATIONS FOR QUOTA GAMES
- My Encounters with John Harsanyi
- Unanimity in Voting for voters
- Analytic functions of the classesL2 andl2 and their kernel functions
- Some Tips Concerning Application of Game Theory to Real Problems
- Game Theory: The bargaining set
- Credible Equilibria in Games with Changing Utility
- Game Theory by Michael Maschler
- Encouraging a coalition formation
- Insights into Game Theory: The Shapley Value in Cooperative Games
- Game Theory: Introduction
- Game Theory: Repeated games
- Game Theory: Behavior strategies and Kuhn's Theorem
- Game Theory: The Shapley value
- A demand adjustment process
- Derivatives of the harmonic measures in multiply-connected domains.
- Game Theory: Mixed strategies
- B. Peleg and P. Sudholter, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, Kluwer Academic, Boston (2003) ISBN 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages
- Insights into Game Theory: Bibliography
- Game Theory: Extensive-form games
- Game Theory: Games with incomplete information and common priors
- CHARACTERIZATION OF THE KERNELS OF CONVEX GAMES
- Game Theory: Index
- Game Theory: The game of chess
- Insights into Game Theory: Social Justice
- Insights into Game Theory: Introduction
- Game Theory: Coalitional games with transferable utility
- Insights into Game Theory: Answers to the Exercises
- Game Theory: The nucleolus
- Game Theory: Social choice
- Game Theory: The core
- How to Play a Game When Utilities Change While Playing
- Game Theory: Acknowledgments
- Call for papers
- ame Theoretic Analysis of a bankruptcy Proble from the Talmud*
- Game Theory: Frontmatter
- Insight Into Game Theory An Alternative Mathematical Experience
- Game Theory: Appendices
- Game Theory: Stable matching
- Game Theory: The universal belief space
- Communications to the Editor—Response to Taylor's “Resolution of a Paradox: Mini-Max Rehabilitated
- Send and claim games in production economies
- Listing service
- Program In Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Memorandum No . 36 CSl July 1968 \ n CD ^ CHARACTERIZATION OF THE KERNELS OF CONVEX GAMES by
- Game Theory: Bargaining games
- Game Theory: Strategic-form games
- Game Theory: Equilibrium refinements
- Game Theory: Correlated equilibria
- Insights into Game Theory: Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud
- Game Theory: Repeated games with vector payoffs
- Game Theory: Auctions
- Game Theory: Games with incomplete information: the general model
- Game Theory: Utility theory
- Chinese Postman Games on a Class of Eulerian Graphs
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, B. Peleg, P. Sudhölter. Kluwer Academic, Boston (2003), 378 pages, ISBN: 1-4020-7410-7
- On The Chinese Postman Game
- The super-additive solution and the concession rate solution for the nash bargaining game
- A demand adjustment process
- Book Review: B. Peleg, P. Sudhölter, , Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games (2003) Kluwer Academic, Boston 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages
- The general nucleolus as a subset of the least core
- Insights into Game Theory: Mathematical Matching

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Israeli university in Jerusalem

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